79 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security
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## Resources
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[Mozilla’s HTTP Observatory CLI](https://github.com/mozilla/http-observatory-cli) and the
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[Qualys SSL Labs Server Test](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html) are good resources for finding
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potential problems and ensuring compliance with security best practices.
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<!-- Uncomment these sections when CSP/SRI are implemented.
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### Content Security Policy (CSP)
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Content Security Policy is a web standard that intends to mitigate certain
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forms of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) as well as data injection.
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Content Security Policy rules should be taken into consideration when
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implementing new features, especially those that may rely on connection with
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external services.
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GitLab's CSP is used for the following:
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- Blocking plugins like Flash and Silverlight from running at all on our pages.
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- Blocking the use of scripts and stylesheets downloaded from external sources.
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- Upgrading `http` requests to `https` when possible.
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- Preventing `iframe` elements from loading in most contexts.
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Some exceptions include:
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- Scripts from Google Analytics and Piwik if either is enabled.
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- Connecting with GitHub, Bitbucket, GitLab.com, etc. to allow project importing.
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- Connecting with Google, Twitter, GitHub, etc. to allow OAuth authentication.
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We use [the Secure Headers gem](https://github.com/twitter/secureheaders) to enable Content
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Security Policy headers in the GitLab Rails app.
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Some resources on implementing Content Security Policy:
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- [MDN Article on CSP](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/CSP)
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- [GitHub’s CSP Journey on the GitHub Engineering Blog](http://githubengineering.com/githubs-csp-journey/)
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- The Dropbox Engineering Blog's series on CSP: [1](https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2015/09/on-csp-reporting-and-filtering/), [2](https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2015/09/unsafe-inline-and-nonce-deployment/), [3](https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2015/09/csp-the-unexpected-eval/), [4](https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2015/09/csp-third-party-integrations-and-privilege-separation/)
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### Subresource Integrity (SRI)
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Subresource Integrity prevents malicious assets from being provided by a CDN by
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guaranteeing that the asset downloaded is identical to the asset the server
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is expecting.
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The Rails app generates a unique hash of the asset, which is used as the
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asset's `integrity` attribute. The browser generates the hash of the asset
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on-load and will reject the asset if the hashes do not match.
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All CSS and JavaScript assets should use Subresource Integrity.
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Some resources on implementing Subresource Integrity:
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- [MDN Article on SRI](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-us/docs/web/security/subresource_integrity)
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- [Subresource Integrity on the GitHub Engineering Blog](http://githubengineering.com/subresource-integrity/)
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-->
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## Including external resources
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External fonts, CSS, and JavaScript should never be used with the exception of
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Google Analytics and Piwik - and only when the instance has enabled it. Assets
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should always be hosted and served locally from the GitLab instance. Embedded
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resources via `iframes` should never be used except in certain circumstances
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such as with reCAPTCHA, which cannot be used without an `iframe`.
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## Avoiding inline scripts and styles
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In order to protect users from [XSS vulnerabilities](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting), we will disable
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inline scripts in the future using Content Security Policy.
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While inline scripts can be useful, they're also a security concern. If
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user-supplied content is unintentionally left un-sanitized, malicious users can
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inject scripts into the web app.
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Inline styles should be avoided in almost all cases, they should only be used
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when no alternatives can be found. This allows reusability of styles as well as
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readability.
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