dex/storage/conformance/conformance.go

1046 lines
30 KiB
Go
Raw Permalink Normal View History

// Package conformance provides conformance tests for storage implementations.
package conformance
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
import (
"reflect"
"sort"
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/kylelemons/godebug/pretty"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
)
// ensure that values being tested on never expire.
var neverExpire = time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Hour * 24 * 365 * 100)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
type subTest struct {
name string
run func(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage)
}
func runTests(t *testing.T, newStorage func() storage.Storage, tests []subTest) {
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := newStorage()
test.run(t, s)
s.Close()
})
}
}
// RunTests runs a set of conformance tests against a storage. newStorage should
// return an initialized but empty storage. The storage will be closed at the
// end of each test run.
func RunTests(t *testing.T, newStorage func() storage.Storage) {
runTests(t, newStorage, []subTest{
{"AuthCodeCRUD", testAuthCodeCRUD},
{"AuthRequestCRUD", testAuthRequestCRUD},
{"ClientCRUD", testClientCRUD},
{"RefreshTokenCRUD", testRefreshTokenCRUD},
{"PasswordCRUD", testPasswordCRUD},
{"KeysCRUD", testKeysCRUD},
{"OfflineSessionCRUD", testOfflineSessionCRUD},
{"ConnectorCRUD", testConnectorCRUD},
{"GarbageCollection", testGC},
{"TimezoneSupport", testTimezones},
{"DeviceRequestCRUD", testDeviceRequestCRUD},
{"DeviceTokenCRUD", testDeviceTokenCRUD},
})
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
func mustLoadJWK(b string) *jose.JSONWebKey {
var jwt jose.JSONWebKey
if err := jwt.UnmarshalJSON([]byte(b)); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return &jwt
}
func mustBeErrNotFound(t *testing.T, kind string, err error) {
switch {
case err == nil:
t.Errorf("deleting non-existent %s should return an error", kind)
case err != storage.ErrNotFound:
t.Errorf("deleting %s expected storage.ErrNotFound, got %v", kind, err)
}
}
func mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t *testing.T, kind string, err error) {
switch {
case err == nil:
t.Errorf("attempting to create an existing %s should return an error", kind)
case err != storage.ErrAlreadyExists:
t.Errorf("creating an existing %s expected storage.ErrAlreadyExists, got %v", kind, err)
}
}
func testAuthRequestCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
codeChallenge := storage.PKCE{
CodeChallenge: "code_challenge_test",
CodeChallengeMethod: "plain",
}
a1 := storage.AuthRequest{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client1",
ResponseTypes: []string{"code"},
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foo",
State: "bar",
ForceApprovalPrompt: true,
LoggedIn: true,
Expiry: neverExpire,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
PKCE: codeChallenge,
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
2016-08-03 10:27:36 +05:30
identity := storage.Claims{Email: "foobar"}
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
if err := s.CreateAuthRequest(a1); err != nil {
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth request: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same AuthRequest twice.
err := s.CreateAuthRequest(a1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "auth request", err)
a2 := storage.AuthRequest{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client2",
ResponseTypes: []string{"code"},
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "bar",
State: "foo",
ForceApprovalPrompt: true,
LoggedIn: true,
Expiry: neverExpire,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "2",
Username: "john",
Email: "john.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a"},
},
}
if err := s.CreateAuthRequest(a2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth request: %v", err)
}
if err := s.UpdateAuthRequest(a1.ID, func(old storage.AuthRequest) (storage.AuthRequest, error) {
old.Claims = identity
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
old.ConnectorID = "connID"
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to update auth request: %v", err)
}
got, err := s.GetAuthRequest(a1.ID)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get auth req: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got.Claims, identity) {
t.Fatalf("update failed, wanted identity=%#v got %#v", identity, got.Claims)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got.PKCE, codeChallenge) {
t.Fatalf("storage does not support PKCE, wanted challenge=%#v got %#v", codeChallenge, got.PKCE)
}
if err := s.DeleteAuthRequest(a1.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete auth request: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteAuthRequest(a2.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete auth request: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetAuthRequest(a1.ID)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "auth request", err)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
func testAuthCodeCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
a1 := storage.AuthCode{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client1",
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foobar",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: neverExpire,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
PKCE: storage.PKCE{
CodeChallenge: "12345",
CodeChallengeMethod: "Whatever",
},
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
}
if err := s.CreateAuthCode(a1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth code: %v", err)
}
a2 := storage.AuthCode{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client2",
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foobar",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: neverExpire,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "2",
Username: "john",
Email: "john.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a"},
},
}
// Attempt to create same AuthCode twice.
err := s.CreateAuthCode(a1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "auth code", err)
if err := s.CreateAuthCode(a2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth code: %v", err)
}
got, err := s.GetAuthCode(a1.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get auth code: %v", err)
}
if a1.Expiry.Unix() != got.Expiry.Unix() {
t.Errorf("auth code expiry did not match want=%s vs got=%s", a1.Expiry, got.Expiry)
}
got.Expiry = a1.Expiry // time fields do not compare well
if diff := pretty.Compare(a1, got); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("auth code retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
if err := s.DeleteAuthCode(a1.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete auth code: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteAuthCode(a2.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete auth code: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetAuthCode(a1.ID)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "auth code", err)
}
func testClientCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
id1 := storage.NewID()
c1 := storage.Client{
ID: id1,
Secret: "foobar",
RedirectURIs: []string{"foo://bar.com/", "https://auth.example.com"},
Name: "dex client",
LogoURL: "https://goo.gl/JIyzIC",
}
err := s.DeleteClient(id1)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "client", err)
if err := s.CreateClient(c1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create client: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same Client twice.
err = s.CreateClient(c1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "client", err)
id2 := storage.NewID()
c2 := storage.Client{
ID: id2,
Secret: "barfoo",
RedirectURIs: []string{"foo://bar.com/", "https://auth.example.com"},
Name: "dex client",
LogoURL: "https://goo.gl/JIyzIC",
}
if err := s.CreateClient(c2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create client: %v", err)
}
getAndCompare := func(_ string, want storage.Client) {
gc, err := s.GetClient(id1)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("get client: %v", err)
return
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, gc); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("client retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
getAndCompare(id1, c1)
newSecret := "barfoo"
err = s.UpdateClient(id1, func(old storage.Client) (storage.Client, error) {
old.Secret = newSecret
return old, nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("update client: %v", err)
}
c1.Secret = newSecret
getAndCompare(id1, c1)
if err := s.DeleteClient(id1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete client: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteClient(id2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete client: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetClient(id1)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "client", err)
}
func testRefreshTokenCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
2016-08-03 10:27:36 +05:30
id := storage.NewID()
refresh := storage.RefreshToken{
ID: id,
Token: "bar",
ObsoleteToken: "",
Nonce: "foo",
ClientID: "client_id",
ConnectorID: "client_secret",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email", "profile"},
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
LastUsed: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
if err := s.CreateRefresh(refresh); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create refresh token: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same Refresh Token twice.
err := s.CreateRefresh(refresh)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "refresh token", err)
getAndCompare := func(id string, want storage.RefreshToken) {
gr, err := s.GetRefresh(id)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("get refresh: %v", err)
return
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(gr.CreatedAt.UnixNano(), gr.CreatedAt.UnixNano()); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("refresh token created timestamp retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(gr.LastUsed.UnixNano(), gr.LastUsed.UnixNano()); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("refresh token last used timestamp retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
gr.CreatedAt = time.Time{}
gr.LastUsed = time.Time{}
want.CreatedAt = time.Time{}
want.LastUsed = time.Time{}
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, gr); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("refresh token retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
getAndCompare(id, refresh)
id2 := storage.NewID()
refresh2 := storage.RefreshToken{
ID: id2,
Token: "bar_2",
ObsoleteToken: refresh.Token,
Nonce: "foo_2",
ClientID: "client_id_2",
ConnectorID: "client_secret",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email", "profile"},
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
LastUsed: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "2",
Username: "john",
Email: "john.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
}
if err := s.CreateRefresh(refresh2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create second refresh token: %v", err)
}
getAndCompare(id2, refresh2)
updatedAt := time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond)
updater := func(r storage.RefreshToken) (storage.RefreshToken, error) {
r.Token = "spam"
r.LastUsed = updatedAt
return r, nil
}
if err := s.UpdateRefreshToken(id, updater); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to update refresh token: %v", err)
}
refresh.Token = "spam"
refresh.LastUsed = updatedAt
getAndCompare(id, refresh)
// Ensure that updating the first token doesn't impact the second. Issue #847.
getAndCompare(id2, refresh2)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
if err := s.DeleteRefresh(id); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete refresh request: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteRefresh(id2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete refresh request: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetRefresh(id)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "refresh token", err)
}
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
type byEmail []storage.Password
func (n byEmail) Len() int { return len(n) }
func (n byEmail) Less(i, j int) bool { return n[i].Email < n[j].Email }
func (n byEmail) Swap(i, j int) { n[i], n[j] = n[j], n[i] }
func testPasswordCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
// Use bcrypt.MinCost to keep the tests short.
passwordHash1, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("secret"), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
password1 := storage.Password{
Email: "jane@example.com",
Hash: passwordHash1,
Username: "jane",
UserID: "foobar",
}
if err := s.CreatePassword(password1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create password token: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same Password twice.
err = s.CreatePassword(password1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "password", err)
passwordHash2, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("password"), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
password2 := storage.Password{
Email: "john@example.com",
Hash: passwordHash2,
Username: "john",
UserID: "barfoo",
}
if err := s.CreatePassword(password2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create password token: %v", err)
}
getAndCompare := func(id string, want storage.Password) {
gr, err := s.GetPassword(id)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("get password %q: %v", id, err)
return
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, gr); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("password retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
getAndCompare("jane@example.com", password1)
getAndCompare("JANE@example.com", password1) // Emails should be case insensitive
if err := s.UpdatePassword(password1.Email, func(old storage.Password) (storage.Password, error) {
old.Username = "jane doe"
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to update auth request: %v", err)
}
password1.Username = "jane doe"
getAndCompare("jane@example.com", password1)
var passwordList []storage.Password
passwordList = append(passwordList, password1, password2)
listAndCompare := func(want []storage.Password) {
passwords, err := s.ListPasswords()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("list password: %v", err)
return
}
sort.Sort(byEmail(want))
sort.Sort(byEmail(passwords))
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, passwords); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("password list retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
listAndCompare(passwordList)
if err := s.DeletePassword(password1.Email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete password: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeletePassword(password2.Email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete password: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetPassword(password1.Email)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "password", err)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
func testOfflineSessionCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
userID1 := storage.NewID()
session1 := storage.OfflineSessions{
2018-01-30 16:48:00 +05:30
UserID: userID1,
ConnID: "Conn1",
Refresh: make(map[string]*storage.RefreshTokenRef),
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
}
// Creating an OfflineSession with an empty Refresh list to ensure that
// an empty map is translated as expected by the storage.
if err := s.CreateOfflineSessions(session1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create offline session with UserID = %s: %v", session1.UserID, err)
}
// Attempt to create same OfflineSession twice.
err := s.CreateOfflineSessions(session1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "offline session", err)
userID2 := storage.NewID()
session2 := storage.OfflineSessions{
2018-01-30 16:48:00 +05:30
UserID: userID2,
ConnID: "Conn2",
Refresh: make(map[string]*storage.RefreshTokenRef),
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
}
if err := s.CreateOfflineSessions(session2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create offline session with UserID = %s: %v", session2.UserID, err)
}
getAndCompare := func(userID string, connID string, want storage.OfflineSessions) {
gr, err := s.GetOfflineSessions(userID, connID)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("get offline session: %v", err)
return
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, gr); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("offline session retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
getAndCompare(userID1, "Conn1", session1)
id := storage.NewID()
tokenRef := storage.RefreshTokenRef{
ID: id,
ClientID: "client_id",
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
LastUsed: time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Millisecond),
}
session1.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
if err := s.UpdateOfflineSessions(session1.UserID, session1.ConnID, func(old storage.OfflineSessions) (storage.OfflineSessions, error) {
old.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to update offline session: %v", err)
}
getAndCompare(userID1, "Conn1", session1)
if err := s.DeleteOfflineSessions(session1.UserID, session1.ConnID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete offline session: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteOfflineSessions(session2.UserID, session2.ConnID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete offline session: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetOfflineSessions(session1.UserID, session1.ConnID)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "offline session", err)
}
func testConnectorCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
id1 := storage.NewID()
config1 := []byte(`{"issuer": "https://accounts.google.com"}`)
c1 := storage.Connector{
ID: id1,
Type: "Default",
Name: "Default",
Config: config1,
}
if err := s.CreateConnector(c1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create connector with ID = %s: %v", c1.ID, err)
}
// Attempt to create same Connector twice.
err := s.CreateConnector(c1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "connector", err)
id2 := storage.NewID()
config2 := []byte(`{"redirectURI": "http://127.0.0.1:5556/dex/callback"}`)
c2 := storage.Connector{
ID: id2,
Type: "Mock",
Name: "Mock",
Config: config2,
}
if err := s.CreateConnector(c2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create connector with ID = %s: %v", c2.ID, err)
}
getAndCompare := func(id string, want storage.Connector) {
gr, err := s.GetConnector(id)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("get connector: %v", err)
return
}
// ignore resource version comparison
gr.ResourceVersion = ""
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, gr); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("connector retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
getAndCompare(id1, c1)
if err := s.UpdateConnector(c1.ID, func(old storage.Connector) (storage.Connector, error) {
old.Type = "oidc"
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to update Connector: %v", err)
}
c1.Type = "oidc"
getAndCompare(id1, c1)
connectorList := []storage.Connector{c1, c2}
listAndCompare := func(want []storage.Connector) {
connectors, err := s.ListConnectors()
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("list connectors: %v", err)
return
}
// ignore resource version comparison
for i := range connectors {
connectors[i].ResourceVersion = ""
}
sort.Slice(connectors, func(i, j int) bool {
return connectors[i].Name < connectors[j].Name
})
if diff := pretty.Compare(want, connectors); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("connector list retrieved from storage did not match: %s", diff)
}
}
listAndCompare(connectorList)
if err := s.DeleteConnector(c1.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete connector: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteConnector(c2.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to delete connector: %v", err)
}
_, err = s.GetConnector(c1.ID)
mustBeErrNotFound(t, "connector", err)
}
func testKeysCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
updateAndCompare := func(k storage.Keys) {
err := s.UpdateKeys(func(oldKeys storage.Keys) (storage.Keys, error) {
return k, nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to update keys: %v", err)
return
}
if got, err := s.GetKeys(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to get keys: %v", err)
} else {
got.NextRotation = got.NextRotation.UTC()
if diff := pretty.Compare(k, got); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("got keys did not equal expected: %s", diff)
}
}
}
// Postgres isn't as accurate with nano seconds as we'd like
n := time.Now().UTC().Round(time.Second)
keys1 := storage.Keys{
SigningKey: jsonWebKeys[0].Private,
SigningKeyPub: jsonWebKeys[0].Public,
NextRotation: n,
}
keys2 := storage.Keys{
SigningKey: jsonWebKeys[2].Private,
SigningKeyPub: jsonWebKeys[2].Public,
NextRotation: n.Add(time.Hour),
VerificationKeys: []storage.VerificationKey{
{
PublicKey: jsonWebKeys[0].Public,
Expiry: n.Add(time.Hour),
},
{
PublicKey: jsonWebKeys[1].Public,
Expiry: n.Add(time.Hour * 2),
},
},
}
updateAndCompare(keys1)
updateAndCompare(keys2)
}
func testGC(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
est, err := time.LoadLocation("America/New_York")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
pst, err := time.LoadLocation("America/Los_Angeles")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expiry := time.Now().In(est)
c := storage.AuthCode{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "foobar",
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foobar",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: expiry,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
}
if err := s.CreateAuthCode(c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth code: %v", err)
}
for _, tz := range []*time.Location{time.UTC, est, pst} {
result, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(-time.Hour).In(tz))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if result.AuthCodes != 0 || result.AuthRequests != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no garbage collection results, got %#v", result)
}
if _, err := s.GetAuthCode(c.ID); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected to be able to get auth code after GC: %v", err)
}
}
if r, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if r.AuthCodes != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected to garbage collect 1 objects, got %d", r.AuthCodes)
}
if _, err := s.GetAuthCode(c.ID); err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected auth code to be GC'd")
} else if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected storage.ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
}
a := storage.AuthRequest{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "foobar",
ResponseTypes: []string{"code"},
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foo",
State: "bar",
ForceApprovalPrompt: true,
LoggedIn: true,
Expiry: expiry,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
}
if err := s.CreateAuthRequest(a); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth request: %v", err)
}
for _, tz := range []*time.Location{time.UTC, est, pst} {
result, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(-time.Hour).In(tz))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if result.AuthCodes != 0 || result.AuthRequests != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no garbage collection results, got %#v", result)
}
if _, err := s.GetAuthRequest(a.ID); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected to be able to get auth request after GC: %v", err)
}
}
if r, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if r.AuthRequests != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected to garbage collect 1 objects, got %d", r.AuthRequests)
}
if _, err := s.GetAuthRequest(a.ID); err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected auth request to be GC'd")
} else if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected storage.ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
}
d := storage.DeviceRequest{
UserCode: storage.NewUserCode(),
DeviceCode: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client1",
ClientSecret: "secret1",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: expiry,
}
if err := s.CreateDeviceRequest(d); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating device request: %v", err)
}
for _, tz := range []*time.Location{time.UTC, est, pst} {
result, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(-time.Hour).In(tz))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if result.DeviceRequests != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no device garbage collection results, got %#v", result)
}
if _, err := s.GetDeviceRequest(d.UserCode); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected to be able to get auth request after GC: %v", err)
}
}
if r, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if r.DeviceRequests != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected to garbage collect 1 device request, got %d", r.DeviceRequests)
}
if _, err := s.GetDeviceRequest(d.UserCode); err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected device request to be GC'd")
} else if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected storage.ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
}
dt := storage.DeviceToken{
DeviceCode: storage.NewID(),
Status: "pending",
Token: "foo",
Expiry: expiry,
LastRequestTime: time.Now(),
PollIntervalSeconds: 0,
PKCE: storage.PKCE{
CodeChallenge: "challenge",
CodeChallengeMethod: "S256",
},
}
if err := s.CreateDeviceToken(dt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating device token: %v", err)
}
for _, tz := range []*time.Location{time.UTC, est, pst} {
result, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(-time.Hour).In(tz))
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if result.DeviceTokens != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no device token garbage collection results, got %#v", result)
}
if _, err := s.GetDeviceToken(dt.DeviceCode); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected to be able to get device token after GC: %v", err)
}
}
if r, err := s.GarbageCollect(expiry.Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Errorf("garbage collection failed: %v", err)
} else if r.DeviceTokens != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected to garbage collect 1 device token, got %d", r.DeviceTokens)
}
if _, err := s.GetDeviceToken(dt.DeviceCode); err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected device token to be GC'd")
} else if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected storage.ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
}
}
// testTimezones tests that backends either fully support timezones or
// do the correct standardization.
func testTimezones(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
est, err := time.LoadLocation("America/New_York")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Create an expiry with timezone info. Only expect backends to be
// accurate to the millisecond
expiry := time.Now().In(est).Round(time.Millisecond)
c := storage.AuthCode{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "foobar",
RedirectURI: "https://localhost:80/callback",
Nonce: "foobar",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: expiry,
ConnectorID: "ldap",
ConnectorData: []byte(`{"some":"data"}`),
Claims: storage.Claims{
UserID: "1",
Username: "jane",
Email: "jane.doe@example.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"a", "b"},
},
}
if err := s.CreateAuthCode(c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating auth code: %v", err)
}
got, err := s.GetAuthCode(c.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get auth code: %v", err)
}
// Ensure that if the resulting time is converted to the same
// timezone, it's the same value. We DO NOT expect timezones
// to be preserved.
gotTime := got.Expiry.In(est)
wantTime := expiry
if !gotTime.Equal(wantTime) {
t.Fatalf("expected expiry %v got %v", wantTime, gotTime)
}
}
func testDeviceRequestCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
d1 := storage.DeviceRequest{
UserCode: storage.NewUserCode(),
DeviceCode: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: "client1",
ClientSecret: "secret1",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
Expiry: neverExpire,
}
if err := s.CreateDeviceRequest(d1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating device request: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same DeviceRequest twice.
err := s.CreateDeviceRequest(d1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "device request", err)
// No manual deletes for device requests, will be handled by garbage collection routines
// see testGC
}
func testDeviceTokenCRUD(t *testing.T, s storage.Storage) {
codeChallenge := storage.PKCE{
CodeChallenge: "code_challenge_test",
CodeChallengeMethod: "plain",
}
// Create a Token
d1 := storage.DeviceToken{
DeviceCode: storage.NewID(),
Status: "pending",
Token: storage.NewID(),
Expiry: neverExpire,
LastRequestTime: time.Now(),
PollIntervalSeconds: 0,
PKCE: codeChallenge,
}
if err := s.CreateDeviceToken(d1); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed creating device token: %v", err)
}
// Attempt to create same Device Token twice.
err := s.CreateDeviceToken(d1)
mustBeErrAlreadyExists(t, "device token", err)
// Update the device token, simulate a redemption
if err := s.UpdateDeviceToken(d1.DeviceCode, func(old storage.DeviceToken) (storage.DeviceToken, error) {
old.Token = "token data"
old.Status = "complete"
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to update device token: %v", err)
}
// Retrieve the device token
got, err := s.GetDeviceToken(d1.DeviceCode)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get device token: %v", err)
}
// Validate expected result set
if got.Status != "complete" {
t.Fatalf("update failed, wanted token status=%v got %v", "complete", got.Status)
}
if got.Token != "token data" {
t.Fatalf("update failed, wanted token %v got %v", "token data", got.Token)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got.PKCE, codeChallenge) {
t.Fatalf("storage does not support PKCE, wanted challenge=%#v got %#v", codeChallenge, got.PKCE)
}
}