Noteable additions:
- `redefines-builtin-id` forbid variable names that shadow go builtins
- `empty-lines` remove unnecessary empty lines that `gofumpt` does not
remove for some reason
- `superfluous-else` eliminate more superfluous `else` branches
Rules are also sorted alphabetically and I cleaned up various parts of
`.golangci.yml`.
(cherry picked from commit 74f0c84fa4245a20ce6fb87dac1faf2aeeded2a2)
Conflicts:
.golangci.yml
apply the linter recommendations to Forgejo code as well
When the ldap synchronizer is look for an email address and fails at
finding one, it falls back at creating one using "localhost.local"
domain.
This new field makes this domain name configurable.
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/3414
Reviewed-by: Earl Warren <earl-warren@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
Co-committed-by: Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
A remote user (UserTypeRemoteUser) is a placeholder that can be
promoted to a regular user (UserTypeIndividual). It represents users
that exist somewhere else. Although the UserTypeRemoteUser already
exists in Forgejo, it is neither used or documented.
A new login type / source (Remote) is introduced and set to be the login type
of remote users.
Type UserTypeRemoteUser
LogingType Remote
The association between a remote user and its counterpart in another
environment (for instance another forge) is via the OAuth2 login
source:
LoginName set to the unique identifier relative to the login source
LoginSource set to the identifier of the remote source
For instance when migrating from GitLab.com, a user can be created as
if it was authenticated using GitLab.com as an OAuth2 authentication
source.
When a user authenticates to Forejo from the same authentication
source and the identifier match, the remote user is promoted to a
regular user. For instance if 43 is the ID of the GitLab.com OAuth2
login source, 88 is the ID of the Remote loging source, and 48323
is the identifier of the foo user:
Type UserTypeRemoteUser
LogingType Remote
LoginName 48323
LoginSource 88
Email (empty)
Name foo
Will be promoted to the following when the user foo authenticates to
the Forgejo instance using GitLab.com as an OAuth2 provider. All users
with a LoginType of Remote and a LoginName of 48323 are examined. If
the LoginSource has a provider name that matches the provider name of
GitLab.com (usually just "gitlab"), it is a match and can be promoted.
The email is obtained via the OAuth2 provider and the user set to:
Type UserTypeIndividual
LogingType OAuth2
LoginName 48323
LoginSource 43
Email foo@example.com
Name foo
Note: the Remote login source is an indirection to the actual login
source, i.e. the provider string my be set to a login source that does
not exist yet.
Cookies may exist on "/subpath" and "/subpath/" for some legacy reasons (eg: changed CookiePath behavior in code). The legacy cookie should be removed correctly.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit b18c04ebde94e23d97da4958173faea843d5344f)
This PR fixed a bug when the user switching pages too fast, he will
logout automatically.
The reason is that when the error is context cancelled, the previous
code think user hasn't login then the session will be deleted. Now it
will return the errors but not think it's not login.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 82db9a2ba77d2a6c470b62be3c82b73c0a544fcc)
Since `modules/context` has to depend on `models` and many other
packages, it should be moved from `modules/context` to
`services/context` according to design principles. There is no logic
code change on this PR, only move packages.
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context`
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/contexttest` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/contexttest` because of depending on
context
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/upload` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload` because of depending on
context
(cherry picked from commit 29f149bd9f517225a3c9f1ca3fb0a7b5325af696)
Conflicts:
routers/api/packages/alpine/alpine.go
routers/api/v1/repo/issue_reaction.go
routers/install/install.go
routers/web/admin/config.go
routers/web/passkey.go
routers/web/repo/search.go
routers/web/repo/setting/default_branch.go
routers/web/user/home.go
routers/web/user/profile.go
tests/integration/editor_test.go
tests/integration/integration_test.go
tests/integration/mirror_push_test.go
trivial context conflicts
also modified all other occurrences in Forgejo specific files
Fix #29249
~~Use the `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/archive/{archive}` API to download.~~
Apply #26430 to archive download URLs.
(cherry picked from commit b762a1f1b1f7941a7db2207552d7b441d868cbe9)
Port of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/29205
Use a clearly defined "signing secret" for token signing.
(cherry picked from commit 8be198cdef0a486f417663b1fd6878458d7e5d92)
- This is a 'front-port' of the already existing patch on v1.21 and
v1.20, but applied on top of what Gitea has done to rework the LTA
mechanism. Forgejo will stick with the reworked mechanism by the Forgejo
Security team for the time being. The removal of legacy code (AES-GCM) has been
left out.
- The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can
construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in
the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is
dumped/leaked.
- This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies).
- Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works.
- Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore.
(cherry picked from commit e3d6622a63da9c33eed1e3d102cf28a92ff653d6)
(cherry picked from commit fef1a6dac5e25579e42d40209c4cfc06879948b9)
(cherry picked from commit b0c5165145fa52f2f7bbec1f50b308bdf1d20ef3)
(cherry picked from commit 7ad51b9f8d0647eecacd258f6ee26155da3872e1)
(cherry picked from commit 64f053f3834e764112cde26bb0d16c5e88d6b2af)
(cherry picked from commit f5e78e4c204ce50b800645d614218b6b6096eecb)
Conflicts:
services/auth/auth_token_test.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2069
(cherry picked from commit f69fc23d4bbadf388c7857040ee0774b824e418e)
(cherry picked from commit d955ab3ab02cbb7f1245a8cddec426d64d3ac500)
(cherry picked from commit 9220088f902a25c4690bcabf5a40a8d02e784182)
(cherry picked from commit c73ac636962c41c71814c273510146f0533264ab)
(cherry picked from commit 747a176048ea93085b406429db0e25bb21912eda)
Conflicts:
models/user/user.go
routers/web/user/setting/account.go
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/2295
Fixes #28660
Fixes an admin api bug related to `user.LoginSource`
Fixed `/user/emails` response not identical to GitHub api
This PR unifies the user update methods. The goal is to keep the logic
only at one place (having audit logs in mind). For example, do the
password checks only in one method not everywhere a password is updated.
After that PR is merged, the user creation should be next.
## Changes
- Add deprecation warning to `Token` and `AccessToken` authentication
methods in swagger.
- Add deprecation warning header to API response. Example:
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
Warning: token and access_token API authentication is deprecated
...
```
- Add setting `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` to reject query string auth
tokens entirely. Default is `false`
## Next steps
- `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` should be true in a subsequent release and
the methods should be removed in swagger
- `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` should be removed and the implementation of
the auth methods in question should be removed
## Open questions
- Should there be further changes to the swagger documentation?
Deprecation is not yet supported for security definitions (coming in
[OpenAPI Spec version
3.2.0](https://github.com/OAI/OpenAPI-Specification/issues/2506))
- Should the API router logger sanitize urls that use `token` or
`access_token`? (This is obviously an insufficient solution on its own)
---------
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
Fixes #27819
We have support for two factor logins with the normal web login and with
basic auth. For basic auth the two factor check was implemented at three
different places and you need to know that this check is necessary. This
PR moves the check into the basic auth itself.
The steps to reproduce it.
First, create a new oauth2 source.
Then, a user login with this oauth2 source.
Disable the oauth2 source.
Visit users -> settings -> security, 500 will be displayed.
This is because this page only load active Oauth2 sources but not all
Oauth2 sources.
Closes #27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
When the user does not set a username lookup condition, LDAP will get an
empty string `""` for the user, hence the following code
```
if isExist, err := user_model.IsUserExist(db.DefaultContext, 0, sr.Username)
```
The user presence determination will always be nonexistent, so updates
to user information will never be performed.
Fix #27049
Part of #27065
This reduces the usage of `db.DefaultContext`. I think I've got enough
files for the first PR. When this is merged, I will continue working on
this.
Considering how many files this PR affect, I hope it won't take to long
to merge, so I don't end up in the merge conflict hell.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Bumping `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` from v4 to v5.
`github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` v5 is bringing some breaking changes:
- standard `Valid()` method on claims is removed. It's replaced by
`ClaimsValidator` interface implementing `Validator()` method instead,
which is called after standard validation. Gitea doesn't seem to be
using this logic.
- `jwt.Token` has a field `Valid`, so it's checked in `ParseToken`
function in `services/auth/source/oauth2/token.go`
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
we refactored `userIDFromToken` for the token parsing part into a new
function `parseToken`. `parseToken` returns the string `token` from
request, and a boolean `ok` representing whether the token exists or
not. So we can distinguish between token non-existence and token
inconsistency in the `verfity` function, thus solving the problem of no
proper error message when the token is inconsistent.
close #24439
related #22119
---------
Co-authored-by: Jason Song <i@wolfogre.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Fix #21072
Username Attribute is not a required item when creating an
authentication source. If Username Attribute is empty, the username
value of LDAP user cannot be read, so all users from LDAP will be marked
as inactive by mistake when synchronizing external users.
This PR improves the sync logic, if username is empty, the email address
will be used to find user.
