Nowadays, cache will be used on almost everywhere of Gitea and it cannot
be disabled, otherwise some features will become unaviable.
Then I think we can just remove the option for cache enable. That means
cache cannot be disabled.
But of course, we can still use cache configuration to set how should
Gitea use the cache.
The steps to reproduce it.
First, create a new oauth2 source.
Then, a user login with this oauth2 source.
Disable the oauth2 source.
Visit users -> settings -> security, 500 will be displayed.
This is because this page only load active Oauth2 sources but not all
Oauth2 sources.
Closes #27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
This PR removed `unittest.MainTest` the second parameter
`TestOptions.GiteaRoot`. Now it detects the root directory by current
working directory.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Part of #27065
This reduces the usage of `db.DefaultContext`. I think I've got enough
files for the first PR. When this is merged, I will continue working on
this.
Considering how many files this PR affect, I hope it won't take to long
to merge, so I don't end up in the merge conflict hell.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
## Changes
- Forces flashed error to render immediately when forgot password code
is incorrect or has expired.
- Adds a link back to the `forgot_password` page so that the user can
restart the process (in the event that their link has expired)
Before:
* `{{.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{$.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{$.root.locale.Tr ...}}`
* `{{template "sub" .}}`
* `{{template "sub" (dict "locale" $.locale)}}`
* `{{template "sub" (dict "root" $)}}`
* .....
With context function: only need to `{{ctx.Locale.Tr ...}}`
The "ctx" could be considered as a super-global variable for all
templates including sub-templates.
To avoid potential risks (any bug in the template context function
package), this PR only starts using "ctx" in "head.tmpl" and
"footer.tmpl" and it has a "DataRaceCheck". If there is anything wrong,
the code can be fixed or reverted easily.
The JSONRedirect/JSONOK/JSONError functions were put into "Base" context
incorrectly, it would cause abuse.
Actually, they are for "web context" only, so, move them to the correct
place.
And by the way, use them to simplify old code: +75 -196
Bumping `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` from v4 to v5.
`github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` v5 is bringing some breaking changes:
- standard `Valid()` method on claims is removed. It's replaced by
`ClaimsValidator` interface implementing `Validator()` method instead,
which is called after standard validation. Gitea doesn't seem to be
using this logic.
- `jwt.Token` has a field `Valid`, so it's checked in `ParseToken`
function in `services/auth/source/oauth2/token.go`
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
The PKCE flow according to [RFC
7636](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636) allows for secure
authorization without the requirement to provide a client secret for the
OAuth app.
It is implemented in Gitea since #5378 (v1.8.0), however without being
able to omit client secret.
Since #21316 Gitea supports setting client type at OAuth app
registration.
As public clients are already forced to use PKCE since #21316, in this
PR the client secret check is being skipped if a public client is
detected. As Gitea seems to implement PKCE authorization correctly
according to the spec, this would allow for PKCE flow without providing
a client secret.
Also add some docs for it, please check language as I'm not a native
English speaker.
Closes #17107
Closes #25047
The "modules/context.go" is too large to maintain.
This PR splits it to separate files, eg: context_request.go,
context_response.go, context_serve.go
This PR will help:
1. The future refactoring for Gitea's web context (eg: simplify the context)
2. Introduce proper "range request" support
3. Introduce context function
This PR only moves code, doesn't change any logic.
This change prevents Gitea from bypassing the manual approval process
for newly registered users when OIDC is used.
- Resolves https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/23392
Signed-off-by: Gary Moon <gary@garymoon.net>
Close #24062
At the beginning, I just wanted to fix the warning mentioned by #24062
But, the cookie code really doesn't look good to me, so clean up them.
Complete the TODO on `SetCookie`:
> TODO: Copied from gitea.com/macaron/macaron and should be improved
after macaron removed.
This PR refactors and improves the password hashing code within gitea
and makes it possible for server administrators to set the password
hashing parameters
In addition it takes the opportunity to adjust the settings for `pbkdf2`
in order to make the hashing a little stronger.
The majority of this work was inspired by PR #14751 and I would like to
thank @boppy for their work on this.
Thanks to @gusted for the suggestion to adjust the `pbkdf2` hashing
parameters.
Close #14751
---------
Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
To avoid duplicated load of the same data in an HTTP request, we can set
a context cache to do that. i.e. Some pages may load a user from a
database with the same id in different areas on the same page. But the
code is hidden in two different deep logic. How should we share the
user? As a result of this PR, now if both entry functions accept
`context.Context` as the first parameter and we just need to refactor
`GetUserByID` to reuse the user from the context cache. Then it will not
be loaded twice on an HTTP request.
But of course, sometimes we would like to reload an object from the
database, that's why `RemoveContextData` is also exposed.
The core context cache is here. It defines a new context
```go
type cacheContext struct {
ctx context.Context
data map[any]map[any]any
lock sync.RWMutex
}
var cacheContextKey = struct{}{}
func WithCacheContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, cacheContextKey, &cacheContext{
ctx: ctx,
data: make(map[any]map[any]any),
})
}
```
Then you can use the below 4 methods to read/write/del the data within
the same context.
```go
func GetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any) any
func SetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key, value any)
func RemoveContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any)
func GetWithContextCache[T any](ctx context.Context, cacheGroupKey string, cacheTargetID any, f func() (T, error)) (T, error)
```
Then let's take a look at how `system.GetString` implement it.
```go
func GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
return cache.GetWithContextCache(ctx, contextCacheKey, key, func() (string, error) {
return cache.GetString(genSettingCacheKey(key), func() (string, error) {
res, err := GetSettingNoCache(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return res.SettingValue, nil
})
})
}
```
First, it will check if context data include the setting object with the
key. If not, it will query from the global cache which may be memory or
a Redis cache. If not, it will get the object from the database. In the
end, if the object gets from the global cache or database, it will be
set into the context cache.
An object stored in the context cache will only be destroyed after the
context disappeared.
Fixes #19555
Test-Instructions:
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/21441#issuecomment-1419438000
This PR implements the mapping of user groups provided by OIDC providers
to orgs teams in Gitea. The main part is a refactoring of the existing
LDAP code to make it usable from different providers.
Refactorings:
- Moved the router auth code from module to service because of import
cycles
- Changed some model methods to take a `Context` parameter
- Moved the mapping code from LDAP to a common location
I've tested it with Keycloak but other providers should work too. The
JSON mapping format is the same as for LDAP.
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
On activating local accounts, the error message didn't differentiate
between using a wrong or expired token, or a wrong password. The result
could already be obtained from the behaviour (different screens were
presented), but the error message was misleading and lead to confusion
for new users on Codeberg with Forgejo.
Now, entering a wrong password for a valid token prints a different
error message.
The problem was introduced in 0f14f69e60.
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
The regular login flow can use a `redirect_to` cookie to ensure the user
ends their authentication flow on the same page as where they started
it.
This commit adds the same functionality to the OAuth login URLs, so that
you can use URLs like these to directly use a specific OAuth provider:
`/user/oauth2/{provider}?redirect_to={post-login path}`
Only the `auth.SignInOAuth()` function needed a change for this, as the
rest of the login flow is aware of this cookie and uses it properly
already.
Change all license headers to comply with REUSE specification.
Fix #16132
Co-authored-by: flynnnnnnnnnn <flynnnnnnnnnn@github>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
Enable this to require captcha validation for user login. You also must
enable `ENABLE_CAPTCHA`.
Summary:
- Consolidate CAPTCHA template
- add CAPTCHA handle and context
- add `REQUIRE_CAPTCHA_FOR_LOGIN` config and docs
- Consolidate CAPTCHA set-up and verification code
Partially resolved #6049
Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zhou <i@sourcehut.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
The OAuth spec [defines two types of
client](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.1),
confidential and public. Previously Gitea assumed all clients to be
confidential.
> OAuth defines two client types, based on their ability to authenticate
securely with the authorization server (i.e., ability to
> maintain the confidentiality of their client credentials):
>
> confidential
> Clients capable of maintaining the confidentiality of their
credentials (e.g., client implemented on a secure server with
> restricted access to the client credentials), or capable of secure
client authentication using other means.
>
> **public
> Clients incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of their
credentials (e.g., clients executing on the device used by the resource
owner, such as an installed native application or a web browser-based
application), and incapable of secure client authentication via any
other means.**
>
> The client type designation is based on the authorization server's
definition of secure authentication and its acceptable exposure levels
of client credentials. The authorization server SHOULD NOT make
assumptions about the client type.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8252#section-8.4
> Authorization servers MUST record the client type in the client
registration details in order to identify and process requests
accordingly.
Require PKCE for public clients:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8252#section-8.1
> Authorization servers SHOULD reject authorization requests from native
apps that don't use PKCE by returning an error message
Fixes #21299
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
According to the OAuth spec
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-6 when "Refreshing
an Access Token"
> The authorization server MUST ... require client authentication for
confidential clients
Fixes #21418
Co-authored-by: Gusted <williamzijl7@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Support OAuth2 applications created by admins on the admin panel, they
aren't owned by anybody.
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lauris BH <lauris@nix.lv>
This fixes error "unauthorized_client: invalid client secret" when
client includes secret in Authorization header rather than request body.
OAuth spec permits both.
Sanity validation that client id and client secret in request are
consistent with Authorization header.
Improve error descriptions. Error codes remain the same.
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zeripath <art27@cantab.net>
Fixes #21282
As suggested by the [OAuth RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749)
(quoted below), it's helpful to give more detail in the description
> error_description
OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII
[[USASCII](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#ref-USASCII)] text
providing **additional information, used to assist the client developer
in understanding the error that occurred.**
Values for the "error_description" parameter MUST NOT include characters
outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
WebAuthn have updated their specification to set the maximum size of the
CredentialID to 1023 bytes. This is somewhat larger than our current
size and therefore we need to migrate.
The PR changes the struct to add CredentialIDBytes and migrates the CredentialID string
to the bytes field before another migration drops the old CredentialID field. Another migration
renames this field back.
Fix #20457
Signed-off-by: Andrew Thornton <art27@cantab.net>
