debian-mirror-gitlab/app/controllers/oauth/authorizations_controller.rb
2023-01-13 15:02:22 +05:30

115 lines
3.7 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
class Oauth::AuthorizationsController < Doorkeeper::AuthorizationsController
include InitializesCurrentUserMode
include Gitlab::Utils::StrongMemoize
before_action :verify_confirmed_email!, :verify_admin_allowed!
layout 'profile'
# Overridden from Doorkeeper::AuthorizationsController to
# include the call to session.delete
def new
if pre_auth.authorizable?
if skip_authorization? || matching_token?
auth = authorization.authorize
parsed_redirect_uri = URI.parse(auth.redirect_uri)
session.delete(:user_return_to)
render "doorkeeper/authorizations/redirect", locals: { redirect_uri: parsed_redirect_uri }, layout: false
else
redirect_uri = URI(authorization.authorize.redirect_uri)
allow_redirect_uri_form_action(redirect_uri.scheme)
render "doorkeeper/authorizations/new"
end
else
render "doorkeeper/authorizations/error"
end
end
private
# Chrome blocks redirections if the form-action CSP directive is present
# and the redirect location's scheme isn't allow-listed
# https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/form-action
# https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/issues/8
def allow_redirect_uri_form_action(redirect_uri_scheme)
return unless content_security_policy?
form_action = request.content_security_policy.form_action
return unless form_action
form_action.push("#{redirect_uri_scheme}:")
request.content_security_policy.form_action(*form_action)
end
def pre_auth_params
# Cannot be achieved with a before_action hook, due to the execution order.
downgrade_scopes! if action_name == 'new'
super
end
# limit scopes when signing in with GitLab
def downgrade_scopes!
auth_type = params.delete('gl_auth_type')
return unless auth_type == 'login'
ensure_read_user_scope!
params['scope'] = Gitlab::Auth::READ_USER_SCOPE.to_s if application_has_read_user_scope?
end
# Configure the application to support read_user scope, if it already
# supports scopes with greater levels of privileges.
def ensure_read_user_scope!
return if application_has_read_user_scope?
return unless application_has_api_scope?
add_read_user_scope!
end
def add_read_user_scope!
return unless doorkeeper_application
scopes = doorkeeper_application.scopes
scopes.add(Gitlab::Auth::READ_USER_SCOPE)
doorkeeper_application.scopes = scopes
doorkeeper_application.save!
end
def doorkeeper_application
strong_memoize(:doorkeeper_application) { ::Doorkeeper::OAuth::Client.find(params['client_id'])&.application }
end
def application_has_read_user_scope?
doorkeeper_application&.includes_scope?(Gitlab::Auth::READ_USER_SCOPE)
end
def application_has_api_scope?
doorkeeper_application&.includes_scope?(*::Gitlab::Auth::API_SCOPES)
end
def verify_confirmed_email!
return if current_user&.confirmed?
pre_auth.error = :unconfirmed_email
render "doorkeeper/authorizations/error"
end
def verify_admin_allowed!
render "doorkeeper/authorizations/forbidden" if disallow_connect?
end
def disallow_connect?
# we're disabling Cop/UserAdmin as OAuth tokens don't seem to respect admin mode
current_user&.admin? && Gitlab::CurrentSettings.disable_admin_oauth_scopes && dangerous_scopes? # rubocop:disable Cop/UserAdmin
end
def dangerous_scopes?
doorkeeper_application&.includes_scope?(*::Gitlab::Auth::API_SCOPE, *::Gitlab::Auth::READ_API_SCOPE,
*::Gitlab::Auth::ADMIN_SCOPES, *::Gitlab::Auth::REPOSITORY_SCOPES,
*::Gitlab::Auth::REGISTRY_SCOPES) && !doorkeeper_application&.trusted?
end
end