module BlobHelper def highlight(blob_name, blob_content, repository: nil, plain: false) highlighted = Gitlab::Highlight.highlight(blob_name, blob_content, plain: plain, repository: repository) raw %(
#{highlighted}
) end def no_highlight_files %w(credits changelog news copying copyright license authors) end def edit_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path, options = {}) return unless current_user blob = project.repository.blob_at(ref, path) rescue nil return unless blob && blob_text_viewable?(blob) from_mr = options[:from_merge_request_id] link_opts = {} link_opts[:from_merge_request_id] = from_mr if from_mr edit_path = namespace_project_edit_blob_path(project.namespace, project, tree_join(ref, path), link_opts) if !on_top_of_branch?(project, ref) button_tag "Edit", class: "btn disabled has-tooltip btn-file-option", title: "You can only edit files when you are on a branch", data: { container: 'body' } elsif can_edit_blob?(blob, project, ref) link_to "Edit", edit_path, class: 'btn btn-sm' elsif can?(current_user, :fork_project, project) continue_params = { to: edit_path, notice: edit_in_new_fork_notice, notice_now: edit_in_new_fork_notice_now } fork_path = namespace_project_forks_path(project.namespace, project, namespace_key: current_user.namespace.id, continue: continue_params) link_to "Edit", fork_path, class: 'btn btn-file-option', method: :post end end def modify_file_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path, label:, action:, btn_class:, modal_type:) return unless current_user blob = project.repository.blob_at(ref, path) rescue nil return unless blob if !on_top_of_branch?(project, ref) button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class} disabled has-tooltip", title: "You can only #{action} files when you are on a branch", data: { container: 'body' } elsif blob.lfs_pointer? button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class} disabled has-tooltip", title: "It is not possible to #{action} files that are stored in LFS using the web interface", data: { container: 'body' } elsif can_edit_blob?(blob, project, ref) button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class}", 'data-target' => "#modal-#{modal_type}-blob", 'data-toggle' => 'modal' elsif can?(current_user, :fork_project, project) continue_params = { to: request.fullpath, notice: edit_in_new_fork_notice + " Try to #{action} this file again.", notice_now: edit_in_new_fork_notice_now } fork_path = namespace_project_forks_path(project.namespace, project, namespace_key: current_user.namespace.id, continue: continue_params) link_to label, fork_path, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class}", method: :post end end def replace_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path) modify_file_link( project, ref, path, label: "Replace", action: "replace", btn_class: "default", modal_type: "upload" ) end def delete_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path) modify_file_link( project, ref, path, label: "Delete", action: "delete", btn_class: "remove", modal_type: "remove" ) end def can_edit_blob?(blob, project = @project, ref = @ref) !blob.lfs_pointer? && can_edit_tree?(project, ref) end def leave_edit_message "Leave edit mode?\nAll unsaved changes will be lost." end def editing_preview_title(filename) if Gitlab::MarkupHelper.previewable?(filename) 'Preview' else 'Preview Changes' end end # Return an image icon depending on the file mode and extension # # mode - File unix mode # mode - File name def blob_icon(mode, name) icon("#{file_type_icon_class('file', mode, name)} fw") end def blob_text_viewable?(blob) blob && blob.text? && !blob.lfs_pointer? && !blob.only_display_raw? end def blob_size(blob) if blob.lfs_pointer? blob.lfs_size else blob.size end end # SVGs can contain malicious JavaScript; only include whitelisted # elements and attributes. Note that this whitelist is by no means complete # and may omit some elements. def sanitize_svg(blob) blob.data = Gitlab::Sanitizers::SVG.clean(blob.data) blob end # If we blindly set the 'real' content type when serving a Git blob we # are enabling XSS attacks. An attacker could upload e.g. a Javascript # file to a Git repository, trick the browser of a victim into # downloading the blob, and then the 'application/javascript' content # type would tell the browser to execute the attacker's Javascript. By # overriding the content type and setting it to 'text/plain' (in the # example of Javascript) we tell the browser of the victim not to # execute untrusted data. def safe_content_type(blob) if blob.text? 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' elsif blob.image? blob.content_type else 'application/octet-stream' end end def cached_blob? stale = stale?(etag: @blob.id) # The #stale? method sets cache headers. # Because we are opionated we set the cache headers ourselves. response.cache_control[:public] = @project.public? if @ref && @commit && @ref == @commit.id # This is a link to a commit by its commit SHA. That means that the blob # is immutable. The only reason to invalidate the cache is if the commit # was deleted or if the user lost access to the repository. response.cache_control[:max_age] = Blob::CACHE_TIME_IMMUTABLE else # A branch or tag points at this blob. That means that the expected blob # value may change over time. response.cache_control[:max_age] = Blob::CACHE_TIME end response.etag = @blob.id !stale end def licenses_for_select return @licenses_for_select if defined?(@licenses_for_select) licenses = Licensee::License.all @licenses_for_select = { Popular: licenses.select(&:featured).map { |license| { name: license.name, id: license.key } }, Other: licenses.reject(&:featured).map { |license| { name: license.name, id: license.key } } } end def gitignore_names @gitignore_names ||= Gitlab::Template::Gitignore.categories.keys.map do |k| [k, Gitlab::Template::Gitignore.by_category(k).map { |t| { name: t.name } }] end.to_h end def gitlab_ci_ymls @gitlab_ci_ymls ||= Gitlab::Template::GitlabCiYml.categories.keys.map do |k| [k, Gitlab::Template::GitlabCiYml.by_category(k).map { |t| { name: t.name } }] end.to_h end end