module BlobHelper def highlight(blob_name, blob_content, repository: nil, plain: false) highlighted = Gitlab::Highlight.highlight(blob_name, blob_content, plain: plain, repository: repository) raw %(
#{highlighted}
)
end
def no_highlight_files
%w(credits changelog news copying copyright license authors)
end
def edit_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path, options = {})
return unless current_user
blob = project.repository.blob_at(ref, path) rescue nil
return unless blob && blob_text_viewable?(blob)
from_mr = options[:from_merge_request_id]
link_opts = {}
link_opts[:from_merge_request_id] = from_mr if from_mr
edit_path = namespace_project_edit_blob_path(project.namespace, project,
tree_join(ref, path),
link_opts)
if !on_top_of_branch?(project, ref)
button_tag "Edit", class: "btn disabled has-tooltip btn-file-option", title: "You can only edit files when you are on a branch", data: { container: 'body' }
elsif can_edit_blob?(blob, project, ref)
link_to "Edit", edit_path, class: 'btn btn-sm'
elsif can?(current_user, :fork_project, project)
continue_params = {
to: edit_path,
notice: edit_in_new_fork_notice,
notice_now: edit_in_new_fork_notice_now
}
fork_path = namespace_project_forks_path(project.namespace, project, namespace_key: current_user.namespace.id, continue: continue_params)
link_to "Edit", fork_path, class: 'btn btn-file-option', method: :post
end
end
def modify_file_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path, label:, action:, btn_class:, modal_type:)
return unless current_user
blob = project.repository.blob_at(ref, path) rescue nil
return unless blob
if !on_top_of_branch?(project, ref)
button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class} disabled has-tooltip", title: "You can only #{action} files when you are on a branch", data: { container: 'body' }
elsif blob.lfs_pointer?
button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class} disabled has-tooltip", title: "It is not possible to #{action} files that are stored in LFS using the web interface", data: { container: 'body' }
elsif can_edit_blob?(blob, project, ref)
button_tag label, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class}", 'data-target' => "#modal-#{modal_type}-blob", 'data-toggle' => 'modal'
elsif can?(current_user, :fork_project, project)
continue_params = {
to: request.fullpath,
notice: edit_in_new_fork_notice + " Try to #{action} this file again.",
notice_now: edit_in_new_fork_notice_now
}
fork_path = namespace_project_forks_path(project.namespace, project, namespace_key: current_user.namespace.id, continue: continue_params)
link_to label, fork_path, class: "btn btn-#{btn_class}", method: :post
end
end
def replace_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path)
modify_file_link(
project,
ref,
path,
label: "Replace",
action: "replace",
btn_class: "default",
modal_type: "upload"
)
end
def delete_blob_link(project = @project, ref = @ref, path = @path)
modify_file_link(
project,
ref,
path,
label: "Delete",
action: "delete",
btn_class: "remove",
modal_type: "remove"
)
end
def can_edit_blob?(blob, project = @project, ref = @ref)
!blob.lfs_pointer? && can_edit_tree?(project, ref)
end
def leave_edit_message
"Leave edit mode?\nAll unsaved changes will be lost."
end
def editing_preview_title(filename)
if Gitlab::MarkupHelper.previewable?(filename)
'Preview'
else
'Preview Changes'
end
end
# Return an image icon depending on the file mode and extension
#
# mode - File unix mode
# mode - File name
def blob_icon(mode, name)
icon("#{file_type_icon_class('file', mode, name)} fw")
end
def blob_text_viewable?(blob)
blob && blob.text? && !blob.lfs_pointer? && !blob.only_display_raw?
end
def blob_size(blob)
if blob.lfs_pointer?
blob.lfs_size
else
blob.size
end
end
# SVGs can contain malicious JavaScript; only include whitelisted
# elements and attributes. Note that this whitelist is by no means complete
# and may omit some elements.
def sanitize_svg(blob)
blob.data = Gitlab::Sanitizers::SVG.clean(blob.data)
blob
end
# If we blindly set the 'real' content type when serving a Git blob we
# are enabling XSS attacks. An attacker could upload e.g. a Javascript
# file to a Git repository, trick the browser of a victim into
# downloading the blob, and then the 'application/javascript' content
# type would tell the browser to execute the attacker's Javascript. By
# overriding the content type and setting it to 'text/plain' (in the
# example of Javascript) we tell the browser of the victim not to
# execute untrusted data.
def safe_content_type(blob)
if blob.text?
'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
elsif blob.image?
blob.content_type
else
'application/octet-stream'
end
end
def cached_blob?
stale = stale?(etag: @blob.id) # The #stale? method sets cache headers.
# Because we are opionated we set the cache headers ourselves.
response.cache_control[:public] = @project.public?
if @ref && @commit && @ref == @commit.id
# This is a link to a commit by its commit SHA. That means that the blob
# is immutable. The only reason to invalidate the cache is if the commit
# was deleted or if the user lost access to the repository.
response.cache_control[:max_age] = Blob::CACHE_TIME_IMMUTABLE
else
# A branch or tag points at this blob. That means that the expected blob
# value may change over time.
response.cache_control[:max_age] = Blob::CACHE_TIME
end
response.etag = @blob.id
!stale
end
def licenses_for_select
return @licenses_for_select if defined?(@licenses_for_select)
licenses = Licensee::License.all
@licenses_for_select = {
Popular: licenses.select(&:featured).map { |license| { name: license.name, id: license.key } },
Other: licenses.reject(&:featured).map { |license| { name: license.name, id: license.key } }
}
end
def gitignore_names
@gitignore_names ||=
Gitlab::Template::Gitignore.categories.keys.map do |k|
[k, Gitlab::Template::Gitignore.by_category(k).map { |t| { name: t.name } }]
end.to_h
end
def gitlab_ci_ymls
@gitlab_ci_ymls ||=
Gitlab::Template::GitlabCiYml.categories.keys.map do |k|
[k, Gitlab::Template::GitlabCiYml.by_category(k).map { |t| { name: t.name } }]
end.to_h
end
end