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dex/storage/storage.go

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package storage
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base32"
"errors"
"io"
"math/big"
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"strings"
"time"
jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
)
var (
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// ErrNotFound is the error returned by storages if a resource cannot be found.
ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found")
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// ErrAlreadyExists is the error returned by storages if a resource ID is taken during a create.
ErrAlreadyExists = errors.New("ID already exists")
)
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// Kubernetes only allows lower case letters for names.
//
// TODO(ericchiang): refactor ID creation onto the storage.
var encoding = base32.NewEncoding("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567")
// Valid characters for user codes
const validUserCharacters = "BCDFGHJKLMNPQRSTVWXZ"
// NewDeviceCode returns a 32 char alphanumeric cryptographically secure string
func NewDeviceCode() string {
return newSecureID(32)
}
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// NewID returns a random string which can be used as an ID for objects.
func NewID() string {
return newSecureID(16)
}
func newSecureID(len int) string {
buff := make([]byte, len) // random ID.
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, buff); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// Avoid the identifier to begin with number and trim padding
return string(buff[0]%26+'a') + strings.TrimRight(encoding.EncodeToString(buff[1:]), "=")
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}
// GCResult returns the number of objects deleted by garbage collection.
type GCResult struct {
AuthRequests int64
AuthCodes int64
DeviceRequests int64
DeviceTokens int64
}
// IsEmpty returns whether the garbage collection result is empty or not.
func (g *GCResult) IsEmpty() bool {
return g.AuthRequests == 0 &&
g.AuthCodes == 0 &&
g.DeviceRequests == 0 &&
g.DeviceTokens == 0
}
// Storage is the storage interface used by the server. Implementations are
// required to be able to perform atomic compare-and-swap updates and either
// support timezones or standardize on UTC.
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type Storage interface {
Close() error
// TODO(ericchiang): Let the storages set the IDs of these objects.
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CreateAuthRequest(a AuthRequest) error
CreateClient(c Client) error
CreateAuthCode(c AuthCode) error
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CreateRefresh(r RefreshToken) error
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CreatePassword(p Password) error
CreateOfflineSessions(s OfflineSessions) error
CreateConnector(c Connector) error
CreateDeviceRequest(d DeviceRequest) error
CreateDeviceToken(d DeviceToken) error
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// TODO(ericchiang): return (T, bool, error) so we can indicate not found
// requests that way instead of using ErrNotFound.
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GetAuthRequest(id string) (AuthRequest, error)
GetAuthCode(id string) (AuthCode, error)
GetClient(id string) (Client, error)
GetKeys() (Keys, error)
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GetRefresh(id string) (RefreshToken, error)
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GetPassword(email string) (Password, error)
GetOfflineSessions(userID string, connID string) (OfflineSessions, error)
GetConnector(id string) (Connector, error)
GetDeviceRequest(userCode string) (DeviceRequest, error)
GetDeviceToken(deviceCode string) (DeviceToken, error)
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ListClients() ([]Client, error)
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ListRefreshTokens() ([]RefreshToken, error)
ListPasswords() ([]Password, error)
ListConnectors() ([]Connector, error)
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// Delete methods MUST be atomic.
DeleteAuthRequest(id string) error
DeleteAuthCode(code string) error
DeleteClient(id string) error
DeleteRefresh(id string) error
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DeletePassword(email string) error
DeleteOfflineSessions(userID string, connID string) error
DeleteConnector(id string) error
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// Update methods take a function for updating an object then performs that update within
// a transaction. "updater" functions may be called multiple times by a single update call.
//
// Because new fields may be added to resources, updaters should only modify existing
// fields on the old object rather then creating new structs. For example:
//
// updater := func(old storage.Client) (storage.Client, error) {
// old.Secret = newSecret
// return old, nil
// }
// if err := s.UpdateClient(clientID, updater); err != nil {
// // update failed, handle error
// }
//
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UpdateClient(id string, updater func(old Client) (Client, error)) error
UpdateKeys(updater func(old Keys) (Keys, error)) error
UpdateAuthRequest(id string, updater func(a AuthRequest) (AuthRequest, error)) error
UpdateRefreshToken(id string, updater func(r RefreshToken) (RefreshToken, error)) error
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UpdatePassword(email string, updater func(p Password) (Password, error)) error
UpdateOfflineSessions(userID string, connID string, updater func(s OfflineSessions) (OfflineSessions, error)) error
UpdateConnector(id string, updater func(c Connector) (Connector, error)) error
UpdateDeviceToken(deviceCode string, updater func(t DeviceToken) (DeviceToken, error)) error
// GarbageCollect deletes all expired AuthCodes,
// AuthRequests, DeviceRequests, and DeviceTokens.
GarbageCollect(now time.Time) (GCResult, error)
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}
// Client represents an OAuth2 client.
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//
// For further reading see:
// * Trusted peers: https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/CrossClientAuth
// * Public clients: https://developers.google.com/api-client-library/python/auth/installed-app
type Client struct {
// Client ID and secret used to identify the client.
ID string `json:"id" yaml:"id"`
IDEnv string `json:"idEnv" yaml:"idEnv"`
Secret string `json:"secret" yaml:"secret"`
SecretEnv string `json:"secretEnv" yaml:"secretEnv"`
// A registered set of redirect URIs. When redirecting from dex to the client, the URI
// requested to redirect to MUST match one of these values, unless the client is "public".
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirectURIs" yaml:"redirectURIs"`
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// TrustedPeers are a list of peers which can issue tokens on this client's behalf using
// the dynamic "oauth2:server:client_id:(client_id)" scope. If a peer makes such a request,
// this client's ID will appear as the ID Token's audience.
//
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// Clients inherently trust themselves.
TrustedPeers []string `json:"trustedPeers" yaml:"trustedPeers"`
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// Public clients must use either use a redirectURL 127.0.0.1:X or "urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob"
Public bool `json:"public" yaml:"public"`
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// Name and LogoURL used when displaying this client to the end user.
Name string `json:"name" yaml:"name"`
LogoURL string `json:"logoURL" yaml:"logoURL"`
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}
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// Claims represents the ID Token claims supported by the server.
type Claims struct {
UserID string
Username string
PreferredUsername string
Email string
EmailVerified bool
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Groups []string
}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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// Data needed for PKCE (RFC 7636)
type PKCE struct {
CodeChallenge string
CodeChallengeMethod string
}
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// AuthRequest represents a OAuth2 client authorization request. It holds the state
// of a single auth flow up to the point that the user authorizes the client.
type AuthRequest struct {
// ID used to identify the authorization request.
ID string
// ID of the client requesting authorization from a user.
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ClientID string
// Values parsed from the initial request. These describe the resources the client is
// requesting as well as values describing the form of the response.
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ResponseTypes []string
Scopes []string
RedirectURI string
Nonce string
State string
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// The client has indicated that the end user must be shown an approval prompt
// on all requests. The server cannot cache their initial action for subsequent
// attempts.
ForceApprovalPrompt bool
Expiry time.Time
// Has the user proved their identity through a backing identity provider?
//
// If false, the following fields are invalid.
LoggedIn bool
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// The identity of the end user. Generally nil until the user authenticates
// with a backend.
Claims Claims
// The connector used to login the user and any data the connector wishes to persists.
// Set when the user authenticates.
ConnectorID string
ConnectorData []byte
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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// PKCE CodeChallenge and CodeChallengeMethod
PKCE PKCE
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}
// AuthCode represents a code which can be exchanged for an OAuth2 token response.
//
// This value is created once an end user has authorized a client, the server has
// redirect the end user back to the client, but the client hasn't exchanged the
// code for an access_token and id_token.
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type AuthCode struct {
// Actual string returned as the "code" value.
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ID string
// The client this code value is valid for. When exchanging the code for a
// token response, the client must use its client_secret to authenticate.
ClientID string
// As part of the OAuth2 spec when a client makes a token request it MUST
// present the same redirect_uri as the initial redirect. This values is saved
// to make this check.
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.3
RedirectURI string
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// If provided by the client in the initial request, the provider MUST create
// a ID Token with this nonce in the JWT payload.
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Nonce string
// Scopes authorized by the end user for the client.
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Scopes []string
// Authentication data provided by an upstream source.
ConnectorID string
ConnectorData []byte
Claims Claims
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Expiry time.Time
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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// PKCE CodeChallenge and CodeChallengeMethod
PKCE PKCE
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}
// RefreshToken is an OAuth2 refresh token which allows a client to request new
// tokens on the end user's behalf.
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type RefreshToken struct {
ID string
// A single token that's rotated every time the refresh token is refreshed.
//
// May be empty.
Token string
ObsoleteToken string
CreatedAt time.Time
LastUsed time.Time
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// Client this refresh token is valid for.
ClientID string
// Authentication data provided by an upstream source.
ConnectorID string
ConnectorData []byte
Claims Claims
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// Scopes present in the initial request. Refresh requests may specify a set
// of scopes different from the initial request when refreshing a token,
// however those scopes must be encompassed by this set.
Scopes []string
// Nonce value supplied during the initial redirect. This is required to be part
// of the claims of any future id_token generated by the client.
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Nonce string
}
// RefreshTokenRef is a reference object that contains metadata about refresh tokens.
type RefreshTokenRef struct {
ID string
// Client the refresh token is valid for.
ClientID string
CreatedAt time.Time
LastUsed time.Time
}
// OfflineSessions objects are sessions pertaining to users with refresh tokens.
type OfflineSessions struct {
// UserID of an end user who has logged in to the server.
UserID string
// The ID of the connector used to login the user.
ConnID string
// Refresh is a hash table of refresh token reference objects
// indexed by the ClientID of the refresh token.
Refresh map[string]*RefreshTokenRef
// Authentication data provided by an upstream source.
ConnectorData []byte
}
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// Password is an email to password mapping managed by the storage.
type Password struct {
// Email and identifying name of the password. Emails are assumed to be valid and
// determining that an end-user controls the address is left to an outside application.
//
// Emails are case insensitive and should be standardized by the storage.
//
// Storages that don't support an extended character set for IDs, such as '.' and '@'
// (cough cough, kubernetes), must map this value appropriately.
Email string `json:"email"`
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// Bcrypt encoded hash of the password. This package enforces a min cost value of 10
Hash []byte `json:"hash"`
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// Bcrypt encoded hash of the password set in environment variable of this name.
HashFromEnv string `json:"hashFromEnv"`
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// Optional username to display. NOT used during login.
Username string `json:"username"`
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// Randomly generated user ID. This is NOT the primary ID of the Password object.
UserID string `json:"userID"`
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}
// Connector is an object that contains the metadata about connectors used to login to Dex.
type Connector struct {
// ID that will uniquely identify the connector object.
ID string `json:"id"`
// The Type of the connector. E.g. 'oidc' or 'ldap'
Type string `json:"type"`
// The Name of the connector that is used when displaying it to the end user.
Name string `json:"name"`
// ResourceVersion is the static versioning used to keep track of dynamic configuration
// changes to the connector object made by the API calls.
ResourceVersion string `json:"resourceVersion"`
// Config holds all the configuration information specific to the connector type. Since there
// no generic struct we can use for this purpose, it is stored as a byte stream.
Config []byte `json:"email"`
}
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// VerificationKey is a rotated signing key which can still be used to verify
// signatures.
type VerificationKey struct {
PublicKey *jose.JSONWebKey `json:"publicKey"`
Expiry time.Time `json:"expiry"`
}
// Keys hold encryption and signing keys.
type Keys struct {
// Key for creating and verifying signatures. These may be nil.
SigningKey *jose.JSONWebKey
SigningKeyPub *jose.JSONWebKey
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// Old signing keys which have been rotated but can still be used to validate
// existing signatures.
VerificationKeys []VerificationKey
// The next time the signing key will rotate.
//
// For caching purposes, implementations MUST NOT update keys before this time.
NextRotation time.Time
}
// NewUserCode returns a randomized 8 character user code for the device flow.
// No vowels are included to prevent accidental generation of words
func NewUserCode() string {
code := randomString(8)
return code[:4] + "-" + code[4:]
}
func randomString(n int) string {
v := big.NewInt(int64(len(validUserCharacters)))
bytes := make([]byte, n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
c, _ := rand.Int(rand.Reader, v)
bytes[i] = validUserCharacters[c.Int64()]
}
return string(bytes)
}
// DeviceRequest represents an OIDC device authorization request. It holds the state of a device request until the user
// authenticates using their user code or the expiry time passes.
type DeviceRequest struct {
// The code the user will enter in a browser
UserCode string
// The unique device code for device authentication
DeviceCode string
// The client ID the code is for
ClientID string
// The Client Secret
ClientSecret string
// The scopes the device requests
Scopes []string
// The expire time
Expiry time.Time
}
// DeviceToken is a structure which represents the actual token of an authorized device and its rotation parameters
type DeviceToken struct {
DeviceCode string
Status string
Token string
Expiry time.Time
LastRequestTime time.Time
PollIntervalSeconds int
}