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dex/server/handlers.go

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2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
package server
import (
"context"
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
"errors"
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"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"path"
"sort"
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"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
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"time"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/connector"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/server/internal"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
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)
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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const (
CodeChallengeMethodPlain = "plain"
CodeChallengeMethodS256 = "S256"
)
// newHealthChecker returns the healthz handler. The handler runs until the
// provided context is canceled.
func (s *Server) newHealthChecker(ctx context.Context) http.Handler {
h := &healthChecker{s: s}
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// Perform one health check synchronously so the returned handler returns
// valid data immediately.
h.runHealthCheck()
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go func() {
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-time.After(time.Second * 15):
}
h.runHealthCheck()
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}
}()
return h
}
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// healthChecker periodically performs health checks on server dependencies.
// Currently, it only checks that the storage layer is available.
type healthChecker struct {
s *Server
// Result of the last health check: any error and the amount of time it took
// to query the storage.
mu sync.RWMutex
// Guarded by the mutex
err error
passed time.Duration
}
// runHealthCheck performs a single health check and makes the result available
// for any clients performing and HTTP request against the healthChecker.
func (h *healthChecker) runHealthCheck() {
t := h.s.now()
err := checkStorageHealth(h.s.storage, h.s.now)
passed := h.s.now().Sub(t)
if err != nil {
h.s.logger.Errorf("Storage health check failed: %v", err)
}
// Make sure to only hold the mutex to access the fields, and not while
// we're querying the storage object.
h.mu.Lock()
h.err = err
h.passed = passed
h.mu.Unlock()
}
func checkStorageHealth(s storage.Storage, now func() time.Time) error {
a := storage.AuthRequest{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: storage.NewID(),
// Set a short expiry so if the delete fails this will be cleaned up quickly by garbage collection.
Expiry: now().Add(time.Minute),
}
if err := s.CreateAuthRequest(a); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create auth request: %v", err)
}
if err := s.DeleteAuthRequest(a.ID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete auth request: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
func (h *healthChecker) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.mu.RLock()
err := h.err
t := h.passed
h.mu.RUnlock()
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if err != nil {
h.s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Health check failed.")
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return
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "Health check passed in %s", t)
}
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func (s *Server) handlePublicKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// TODO(ericchiang): Cache this.
keys, err := s.storage.GetKeys()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get keys: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal server error.")
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return
}
if keys.SigningKeyPub == nil {
s.logger.Errorf("No public keys found.")
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal server error.")
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return
}
jwks := jose.JSONWebKeySet{
Keys: make([]jose.JSONWebKey, len(keys.VerificationKeys)+1),
}
jwks.Keys[0] = *keys.SigningKeyPub
for i, verificationKey := range keys.VerificationKeys {
jwks.Keys[i+1] = *verificationKey.PublicKey
}
data, err := json.MarshalIndent(jwks, "", " ")
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal discovery data: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal server error.")
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return
}
maxAge := keys.NextRotation.Sub(s.now())
if maxAge < (time.Minute * 2) {
maxAge = time.Minute * 2
}
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", fmt.Sprintf("max-age=%d, must-revalidate", int(maxAge.Seconds())))
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
w.Write(data)
}
type discovery struct {
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
Auth string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
Token string `json:"token_endpoint"`
Keys string `json:"jwks_uri"`
UserInfo string `json:"userinfo_endpoint"`
DeviceEndpoint string `json:"device_authorization_endpoint"`
GrantTypes []string `json:"grant_types_supported"`
ResponseTypes []string `json:"response_types_supported"`
Subjects []string `json:"subject_types_supported"`
IDTokenAlgs []string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
CodeChallengeAlgs []string `json:"code_challenge_methods_supported"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes_supported"`
AuthMethods []string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"`
Claims []string `json:"claims_supported"`
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}
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func (s *Server) discoveryHandler() (http.HandlerFunc, error) {
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d := discovery{
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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Issuer: s.issuerURL.String(),
Auth: s.absURL("/auth"),
Token: s.absURL("/token"),
Keys: s.absURL("/keys"),
UserInfo: s.absURL("/userinfo"),
DeviceEndpoint: s.absURL("/device/code"),
Subjects: []string{"public"},
GrantTypes: []string{grantTypeAuthorizationCode, grantTypeRefreshToken, grantTypeDeviceCode},
IDTokenAlgs: []string{string(jose.RS256)},
CodeChallengeAlgs: []string{CodeChallengeMethodS256, CodeChallengeMethodPlain},
Scopes: []string{"openid", "email", "groups", "profile", "offline_access"},
AuthMethods: []string{"client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"},
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Claims: []string{
"iss", "sub", "aud", "iat", "exp", "email", "email_verified",
"locale", "name", "preferred_username", "at_hash",
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},
}
for responseType := range s.supportedResponseTypes {
d.ResponseTypes = append(d.ResponseTypes, responseType)
}
sort.Strings(d.ResponseTypes)
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data, err := json.MarshalIndent(d, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal discovery data: %v", err)
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}
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
w.Write(data)
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}), nil
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}
// handleAuthorization handles the OAuth2 auth endpoint.
func (s *Server) handleAuthorization(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authReq, err := s.parseAuthorizationRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to parse authorization request: %v", err)
status := http.StatusInternalServerError
// If this is an authErr, let's let it handle the error, or update the HTTP
// status code
if err, ok := err.(*authErr); ok {
if handler, ok := err.Handle(); ok {
// client_id and redirect_uri checked out and we can redirect back to
// the client with the error.
handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
status = err.Status()
}
s.renderError(r, w, status, err.Error())
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return
}
// TODO(ericchiang): Create this authorization request later in the login flow
// so users don't hit "not found" database errors if they wait at the login
// screen too long.
//
// See: https://github.com/dexidp/dex/issues/646
authReq.Expiry = s.now().Add(s.authRequestsValidFor)
if err := s.storage.CreateAuthRequest(*authReq); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to create authorization request: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to connect to the database.")
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return
}
connectors, err := s.storage.ListConnectors()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get list of connectors: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to retrieve connector list.")
return
}
// Redirect if a client chooses a specific connector_id
if authReq.ConnectorID != "" {
for _, c := range connectors {
if c.ID == authReq.ConnectorID {
http.Redirect(w, r, s.absPath("/auth", c.ID)+"?req="+authReq.ID, http.StatusFound)
return
}
}
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidConnectorID, "Connector ID does not match a valid Connector", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
if len(connectors) == 1 && !s.alwaysShowLogin {
for _, c := range connectors {
// TODO(ericchiang): Make this pass on r.URL.RawQuery and let something latter
// on create the auth request.
http.Redirect(w, r, s.absPath("/auth", c.ID)+"?req="+authReq.ID, http.StatusFound)
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return
}
}
connectorInfos := make([]connectorInfo, len(connectors))
for index, conn := range connectors {
connectorInfos[index] = connectorInfo{
ID: conn.ID,
Name: conn.Name,
Type: conn.Type,
// TODO(ericchiang): Make this pass on r.URL.RawQuery and let something latter
// on create the auth request.
URL: s.absPath("/auth", conn.ID) + "?req=" + authReq.ID,
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}
}
if err := s.templates.login(r, w, connectorInfos); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
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}
func (s *Server) handleConnectorLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
connID := mux.Vars(r)["connector"]
conn, err := s.getConnector(connID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get connector: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Requested resource does not exist")
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return
}
authReqID := r.FormValue("req")
authReq, err := s.storage.GetAuthRequest(authReqID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get auth request: %v", err)
if err == storage.ErrNotFound {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Login session expired.")
} else {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Database error.")
}
return
}
// Set the connector being used for the login.
if authReq.ConnectorID != connID {
updater := func(a storage.AuthRequest) (storage.AuthRequest, error) {
if a.ConnectorID != "" {
return a, fmt.Errorf("connector is already set for this auth request")
}
a.ConnectorID = connID
return a, nil
}
if err := s.storage.UpdateAuthRequest(authReqID, updater); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to set connector ID on auth request: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Database error.")
return
}
}
scopes := parseScopes(authReq.Scopes)
showBacklink := len(s.connectors) > 1
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switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
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switch conn := conn.Connector.(type) {
case connector.CallbackConnector:
// Use the auth request ID as the "state" token.
//
// TODO(ericchiang): Is this appropriate or should we also be using a nonce?
callbackURL, err := conn.LoginURL(scopes, s.absURL("/callback"), authReqID)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Connector %q returned error when creating callback: %v", connID, err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Login error.")
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return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, callbackURL, http.StatusFound)
case connector.PasswordConnector:
if err := s.templates.password(r, w, r.URL.String(), "", usernamePrompt(conn), false, showBacklink); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
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case connector.SAMLConnector:
action, value, err := conn.POSTData(scopes, authReqID)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Creating SAML data: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Connector Login Error")
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return
}
// TODO(ericchiang): Don't inline this.
fmt.Fprintf(w, `<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title>SAML login</title>
</head>
<body>
<form method="post" action="%s" >
<input type="hidden" name="SAMLRequest" value="%s" />
<input type="hidden" name="RelayState" value="%s" />
</form>
<script>
document.forms[0].submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>`, action, value, authReqID)
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default:
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Requested resource does not exist.")
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}
case http.MethodPost:
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passwordConnector, ok := conn.Connector.(connector.PasswordConnector)
if !ok {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Requested resource does not exist.")
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return
}
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username := r.FormValue("login")
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password := r.FormValue("password")
identity, ok, err := passwordConnector.Login(r.Context(), scopes, username, password)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to login user: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Login error: %v", err))
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return
}
if !ok {
if err := s.templates.password(r, w, r.URL.String(), username, usernamePrompt(passwordConnector), true, showBacklink); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
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return
}
redirectURL, err := s.finalizeLogin(identity, authReq, conn.Connector)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to finalize login: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Login error.")
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return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)
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default:
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Unsupported request method.")
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}
}
func (s *Server) handleConnectorCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var authID string
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet: // OAuth2 callback
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if authID = r.URL.Query().Get("state"); authID == "" {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "User session error.")
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return
}
case http.MethodPost: // SAML POST binding
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if authID = r.PostFormValue("RelayState"); authID == "" {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "User session error.")
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return
}
default:
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Method not supported")
return
}
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authReq, err := s.storage.GetAuthRequest(authID)
if err != nil {
if err == storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("Invalid 'state' parameter provided: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Requested resource does not exist.")
return
}
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get auth request: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Database error.")
return
}
if connID := mux.Vars(r)["connector"]; connID != "" && connID != authReq.ConnectorID {
s.logger.Errorf("Connector mismatch: authentication started with id %q, but callback for id %q was triggered", authReq.ConnectorID, connID)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Requested resource does not exist.")
return
}
conn, err := s.getConnector(authReq.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get connector with id %q : %v", authReq.ConnectorID, err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Requested resource does not exist.")
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return
}
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var identity connector.Identity
switch conn := conn.Connector.(type) {
case connector.CallbackConnector:
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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s.logger.Errorf("SAML request mapped to OAuth2 connector")
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request")
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return
}
identity, err = conn.HandleCallback(parseScopes(authReq.Scopes), r)
case connector.SAMLConnector:
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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s.logger.Errorf("OAuth2 request mapped to SAML connector")
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request")
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return
}
identity, err = conn.HandlePOST(parseScopes(authReq.Scopes), r.PostFormValue("SAMLResponse"), authReq.ID)
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default:
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Requested resource does not exist.")
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return
}
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to authenticate: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to authenticate: %v", err))
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return
}
redirectURL, err := s.finalizeLogin(identity, authReq, conn.Connector)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to finalize login: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Login error.")
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return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, redirectURL, http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
// finalizeLogin associates the user's identity with the current AuthRequest, then returns
// the approval page's path.
func (s *Server) finalizeLogin(identity connector.Identity, authReq storage.AuthRequest, conn connector.Connector) (string, error) {
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claims := storage.Claims{
UserID: identity.UserID,
Username: identity.Username,
PreferredUsername: identity.PreferredUsername,
Email: identity.Email,
EmailVerified: identity.EmailVerified,
Groups: identity.Groups,
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}
updater := func(a storage.AuthRequest) (storage.AuthRequest, error) {
a.LoggedIn = true
a.Claims = claims
a.ConnectorData = identity.ConnectorData
return a, nil
}
if err := s.storage.UpdateAuthRequest(authReq.ID, updater); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to update auth request: %v", err)
}
email := claims.Email
if !claims.EmailVerified {
email += " (unverified)"
}
s.logger.Infof("login successful: connector %q, username=%q, preferred_username=%q, email=%q, groups=%q",
authReq.ConnectorID, claims.Username, claims.PreferredUsername, email, claims.Groups)
returnURL := path.Join(s.issuerURL.Path, "/approval") + "?req=" + authReq.ID
_, ok := conn.(connector.RefreshConnector)
if !ok {
return returnURL, nil
}
// Try to retrieve an existing OfflineSession object for the corresponding user.
session, err := s.storage.GetOfflineSessions(identity.UserID, authReq.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get offline session: %v", err)
return "", err
}
offlineSessions := storage.OfflineSessions{
UserID: identity.UserID,
ConnID: authReq.ConnectorID,
Refresh: make(map[string]*storage.RefreshTokenRef),
ConnectorData: identity.ConnectorData,
}
// Create a new OfflineSession object for the user and add a reference object for
// the newly received refreshtoken.
if err := s.storage.CreateOfflineSessions(offlineSessions); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create offline session: %v", err)
return "", err
}
return returnURL, nil
}
// Update existing OfflineSession obj with new RefreshTokenRef.
if err := s.storage.UpdateOfflineSessions(session.UserID, session.ConnID, func(old storage.OfflineSessions) (storage.OfflineSessions, error) {
if len(identity.ConnectorData) > 0 {
old.ConnectorData = identity.ConnectorData
}
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to update offline session: %v", err)
return "", err
}
return returnURL, nil
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}
func (s *Server) handleApproval(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authReq, err := s.storage.GetAuthRequest(r.FormValue("req"))
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get auth request: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Database error.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
if !authReq.LoggedIn {
s.logger.Errorf("Auth request does not have an identity for approval")
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Login process not yet finalized.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
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if s.skipApproval {
2016-08-03 10:27:36 +05:30
s.sendCodeResponse(w, r, authReq)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
client, err := s.storage.GetClient(authReq.ClientID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get client %q: %v", authReq.ClientID, err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to retrieve client.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
if err := s.templates.approval(r, w, authReq.ID, authReq.Claims.Username, client.Name, authReq.Scopes); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
case http.MethodPost:
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
if r.FormValue("approval") != "approve" {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Approval rejected.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
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s.sendCodeResponse(w, r, authReq)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
}
2016-08-03 10:27:36 +05:30
func (s *Server) sendCodeResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, authReq storage.AuthRequest) {
2016-10-13 07:20:48 +05:30
if s.now().After(authReq.Expiry) {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "User session has expired.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
if err := s.storage.DeleteAuthRequest(authReq.ID); err != nil {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to delete authorization request: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal server error.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
} else {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusBadRequest, "User session error.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
return
}
u, err := url.Parse(authReq.RedirectURI)
if err != nil {
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Invalid redirect URI.")
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
var (
// Was the initial request using the implicit or hybrid flow instead of
// the "normal" code flow?
implicitOrHybrid = false
// Only present in hybrid or code flow. code.ID == "" if this is not set.
code storage.AuthCode
// ID token returned immediately if the response_type includes "id_token".
// Only valid for implicit and hybrid flows.
idToken string
idTokenExpiry time.Time
2019-05-27 13:11:00 +05:30
// Access token
2019-05-27 14:44:15 +05:30
accessToken string
)
2016-08-20 05:54:49 +05:30
for _, responseType := range authReq.ResponseTypes {
switch responseType {
case responseTypeCode:
code = storage.AuthCode{
ID: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: authReq.ClientID,
ConnectorID: authReq.ConnectorID,
Nonce: authReq.Nonce,
Scopes: authReq.Scopes,
Claims: authReq.Claims,
Expiry: s.now().Add(time.Minute * 30),
RedirectURI: authReq.RedirectURI,
ConnectorData: authReq.ConnectorData,
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
PKCE: authReq.PKCE,
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}
if err := s.storage.CreateAuthCode(code); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to create auth code: %v", err)
s.renderError(r, w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal server error.")
2016-08-20 05:54:49 +05:30
return
}
// Implicit and hybrid flows that try to use the OOB redirect URI are
// rejected earlier. If we got here we're using the code flow.
2016-08-20 05:54:49 +05:30
if authReq.RedirectURI == redirectURIOOB {
if err := s.templates.oob(r, w, code.ID); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
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return
}
case responseTypeToken:
implicitOrHybrid = true
case responseTypeIDToken:
implicitOrHybrid = true
var err error
2019-05-27 13:11:00 +05:30
2019-06-28 04:42:18 +05:30
accessToken, err = s.newAccessToken(authReq.ClientID, authReq.Claims, authReq.Scopes, authReq.Nonce, authReq.ConnectorID)
2019-05-27 13:11:00 +05:30
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create new access token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
idToken, idTokenExpiry, err = s.newIDToken(authReq.ClientID, authReq.Claims, authReq.Scopes, authReq.Nonce, accessToken, authReq.ConnectorID)
2016-08-20 05:54:49 +05:30
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create ID token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
2016-08-20 05:54:49 +05:30
return
}
}
}
if implicitOrHybrid {
v := url.Values{}
v.Set("access_token", accessToken)
v.Set("token_type", "bearer")
v.Set("state", authReq.State)
if idToken != "" {
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v.Set("id_token", idToken)
// The hybrid flow with only "code token" or "code id_token" doesn't return an
// "expires_in" value. If "code" wasn't provided, indicating the implicit flow,
// don't add it.
//
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridAuthResponse
if code.ID == "" {
v.Set("expires_in", strconv.Itoa(int(idTokenExpiry.Sub(s.now()).Seconds())))
}
}
if code.ID != "" {
v.Set("code", code.ID)
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}
// Implicit and hybrid flows return their values as part of the fragment.
//
// HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
// Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
// access_token=SlAV32hkKG
// &token_type=bearer
// &id_token=eyJ0 ... NiJ9.eyJ1c ... I6IjIifX0.DeWt4Qu ... ZXso
// &expires_in=3600
// &state=af0ifjsldkj
//
u.Fragment = v.Encode()
} else {
// The code flow add values to the URL query.
//
// HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
// Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
// code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
// &state=af0ifjsldkj
//
q := u.Query()
q.Set("code", code.ID)
q.Set("state", authReq.State)
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, u.String(), http.StatusSeeOther)
}
func (s *Server) handleToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
clientID, clientSecret, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if ok {
var err error
if clientID, err = url.QueryUnescape(clientID); err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "client_id improperly encoded", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
}
if clientSecret, err = url.QueryUnescape(clientSecret); err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "client_secret improperly encoded", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
}
} else {
clientID = r.PostFormValue("client_id")
clientSecret = r.PostFormValue("client_secret")
}
client, err := s.storage.GetClient(clientID)
if err != nil {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get client: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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} else {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidClient, "Invalid client credentials.", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}
return
}
if client.Secret != clientSecret {
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
if clientSecret == "" {
s.logger.Infof("missing client_secret on token request for client: %s", client.ID)
} else {
s.logger.Infof("invalid client_secret on token request for client: %s", client.ID)
}
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidClient, "Invalid client credentials.", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
}
grantType := r.PostFormValue("grant_type")
switch grantType {
case grantTypeAuthorizationCode:
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s.handleAuthCode(w, r, client)
case grantTypeRefreshToken:
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s.handleRefreshToken(w, r, client)
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case grantTypePassword:
s.handlePasswordGrant(w, r, client)
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default:
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidGrant, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
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}
}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
func (s *Server) calculateCodeChallenge(codeVerifier, codeChallengeMethod string) (string, error) {
switch codeChallengeMethod {
case CodeChallengeMethodPlain:
return codeVerifier, nil
case CodeChallengeMethodS256:
shaSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(codeVerifier))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(shaSum[:]), nil
default:
return "", fmt.Errorf("unknown challenge method (%v)", codeChallengeMethod)
}
}
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// handle an access token request https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.3
func (s *Server) handleAuthCode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client storage.Client) {
code := r.PostFormValue("code")
redirectURI := r.PostFormValue("redirect_uri")
authCode, err := s.storage.GetAuthCode(code)
if err != nil || s.now().After(authCode.Expiry) || authCode.ClientID != client.ID {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get auth code: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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} else {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Invalid or expired code parameter.", http.StatusBadRequest)
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}
return
}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
// RFC 7636 (PKCE)
codeChallengeFromStorage := authCode.PKCE.CodeChallenge
providedCodeVerifier := r.PostFormValue("code_verifier")
switch {
case providedCodeVerifier != "" && codeChallengeFromStorage != "":
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
calculatedCodeChallenge, err := s.calculateCodeChallenge(providedCodeVerifier, authCode.PKCE.CodeChallengeMethod)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error(err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if codeChallengeFromStorage != calculatedCodeChallenge {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidGrant, "Invalid code_verifier.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
case providedCodeVerifier != "":
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
// Received no code_challenge on /auth, but a code_verifier on /token
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "No PKCE flow started. Cannot check code_verifier.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
case codeChallengeFromStorage != "":
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
// Received PKCE request on /auth, but no code_verifier on /token
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidGrant, "Expecting parameter code_verifier in PKCE flow.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
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if authCode.RedirectURI != redirectURI {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "redirect_uri did not match URI from initial request.", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
}
tokenResponse, err := s.exchangeAuthCode(w, authCode, client)
if err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
s.writeAccessToken(w, tokenResponse)
}
func (s *Server) exchangeAuthCode(w http.ResponseWriter, authCode storage.AuthCode, client storage.Client) (*accessTokenResponse, error) {
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accessToken, err := s.newAccessToken(client.ID, authCode.Claims, authCode.Scopes, authCode.Nonce, authCode.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create new access token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
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}
idToken, expiry, err := s.newIDToken(client.ID, authCode.Claims, authCode.Scopes, authCode.Nonce, accessToken, authCode.ConnectorID)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create ID token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
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}
if err := s.storage.DeleteAuthCode(authCode.ID); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to delete auth code: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
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}
reqRefresh := func() bool {
// Ensure the connector supports refresh tokens.
//
// Connectors like `saml` do not implement RefreshConnector.
conn, err := s.getConnector(authCode.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("connector with ID %q not found: %v", authCode.ConnectorID, err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return false
}
_, ok := conn.Connector.(connector.RefreshConnector)
if !ok {
return false
}
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for _, scope := range authCode.Scopes {
if scope == scopeOfflineAccess {
return true
}
}
return false
}()
var refreshToken string
if reqRefresh {
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refresh := storage.RefreshToken{
ID: storage.NewID(),
Token: storage.NewID(),
ClientID: authCode.ClientID,
ConnectorID: authCode.ConnectorID,
Scopes: authCode.Scopes,
Claims: authCode.Claims,
Nonce: authCode.Nonce,
ConnectorData: authCode.ConnectorData,
CreatedAt: s.now(),
LastUsed: s.now(),
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}
token := &internal.RefreshToken{
RefreshId: refresh.ID,
Token: refresh.Token,
}
if refreshToken, err = internal.Marshal(token); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
}
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if err := s.storage.CreateRefresh(refresh); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
// deleteToken determines if we need to delete the newly created refresh token
// due to a failure in updating/creating the OfflineSession object for the
// corresponding user.
var deleteToken bool
defer func() {
if deleteToken {
// Delete newly created refresh token from storage.
if err := s.storage.DeleteRefresh(refresh.ID); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to delete refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
}()
tokenRef := storage.RefreshTokenRef{
ID: refresh.ID,
ClientID: refresh.ClientID,
CreatedAt: refresh.CreatedAt,
LastUsed: refresh.LastUsed,
}
// Try to retrieve an existing OfflineSession object for the corresponding user.
if session, err := s.storage.GetOfflineSessions(refresh.Claims.UserID, refresh.ConnectorID); err != nil {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return nil, err
}
offlineSessions := storage.OfflineSessions{
UserID: refresh.Claims.UserID,
ConnID: refresh.ConnectorID,
Refresh: make(map[string]*storage.RefreshTokenRef),
}
offlineSessions.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
// Create a new OfflineSession object for the user and add a reference object for
// the newly received refreshtoken.
if err := s.storage.CreateOfflineSessions(offlineSessions); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return nil, err
}
} else {
if oldTokenRef, ok := session.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID]; ok {
// Delete old refresh token from storage.
if err := s.storage.DeleteRefresh(oldTokenRef.ID); err != nil && err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to delete refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return nil, err
}
}
// Update existing OfflineSession obj with new RefreshTokenRef.
if err := s.storage.UpdateOfflineSessions(session.UserID, session.ConnID, func(old storage.OfflineSessions) (storage.OfflineSessions, error) {
old.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to update offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return nil, err
}
}
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}
return s.toAccessTokenResponse(idToken, accessToken, refreshToken, expiry), nil
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}
// handle a refresh token request https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-6
func (s *Server) handleRefreshToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client storage.Client) {
code := r.PostFormValue("refresh_token")
scope := r.PostFormValue("scope")
if code == "" {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "No refresh token in request.", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
}
token := new(internal.RefreshToken)
if err := internal.Unmarshal(code, token); err != nil {
// For backward compatibility, assume the refresh_token is a raw refresh token ID
// if it fails to decode.
//
// Because refresh_token values that aren't unmarshable were generated by servers
// that don't have a Token value, we'll still reject any attempts to claim a
// refresh_token twice.
token = &internal.RefreshToken{RefreshId: code, Token: ""}
}
refresh, err := s.storage.GetRefresh(token.RefreshId)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get refresh token: %v", err)
if err == storage.ErrNotFound {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Refresh token is invalid or has already been claimed by another client.", http.StatusBadRequest)
} else {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
return
}
if refresh.ClientID != client.ID {
s.logger.Errorf("client %s trying to claim token for client %s", client.ID, refresh.ClientID)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Refresh token is invalid or has already been claimed by another client.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if refresh.Token != token.Token {
s.logger.Errorf("refresh token with id %s claimed twice", refresh.ID)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Refresh token is invalid or has already been claimed by another client.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
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// Per the OAuth2 spec, if the client has omitted the scopes, default to the original
// authorized scopes.
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-6
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scopes := refresh.Scopes
if scope != "" {
requestedScopes := strings.Fields(scope)
var unauthorizedScopes []string
for _, s := range requestedScopes {
contains := func() bool {
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for _, scope := range refresh.Scopes {
if s == scope {
return true
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}
}
return false
}()
if !contains {
unauthorizedScopes = append(unauthorizedScopes, s)
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}
}
if len(unauthorizedScopes) > 0 {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Requested scopes contain unauthorized scope(s): %q.", unauthorizedScopes)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, msg, http.StatusBadRequest)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
return
}
scopes = requestedScopes
}
2018-01-30 02:16:18 +05:30
var connectorData []byte
session, err := s.storage.GetOfflineSessions(refresh.Claims.UserID, refresh.ConnectorID)
switch {
case err != nil:
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if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get offline session: %v", err)
return
}
case len(refresh.ConnectorData) > 0:
// Use the old connector data if it exists, should be deleted once used
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connectorData = refresh.ConnectorData
default:
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connectorData = session.ConnectorData
}
conn, err := s.getConnector(refresh.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("connector with ID %q not found: %v", refresh.ConnectorID, err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
ident := connector.Identity{
UserID: refresh.Claims.UserID,
Username: refresh.Claims.Username,
PreferredUsername: refresh.Claims.PreferredUsername,
Email: refresh.Claims.Email,
EmailVerified: refresh.Claims.EmailVerified,
Groups: refresh.Claims.Groups,
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ConnectorData: connectorData,
}
// Can the connector refresh the identity? If so, attempt to refresh the data
// in the connector.
//
// TODO(ericchiang): We may want a strict mode where connectors that don't implement
// this interface can't perform refreshing.
if refreshConn, ok := conn.Connector.(connector.RefreshConnector); ok {
newIdent, err := refreshConn.Refresh(r.Context(), parseScopes(scopes), ident)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to refresh identity: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
ident = newIdent
}
claims := storage.Claims{
UserID: ident.UserID,
Username: ident.Username,
PreferredUsername: ident.PreferredUsername,
Email: ident.Email,
EmailVerified: ident.EmailVerified,
Groups: ident.Groups,
}
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accessToken, err := s.newAccessToken(client.ID, claims, scopes, refresh.Nonce, refresh.ConnectorID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create new access token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
idToken, expiry, err := s.newIDToken(client.ID, claims, scopes, refresh.Nonce, accessToken, refresh.ConnectorID)
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if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create ID token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
}
newToken := &internal.RefreshToken{
RefreshId: refresh.ID,
Token: storage.NewID(),
}
rawNewToken, err := internal.Marshal(newToken)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
}
lastUsed := s.now()
updater := func(old storage.RefreshToken) (storage.RefreshToken, error) {
if old.Token != refresh.Token {
return old, errors.New("refresh token claimed twice")
}
old.Token = newToken.Token
// Update the claims of the refresh token.
//
// UserID intentionally ignored for now.
old.Claims.Username = ident.Username
old.Claims.PreferredUsername = ident.PreferredUsername
old.Claims.Email = ident.Email
old.Claims.EmailVerified = ident.EmailVerified
old.Claims.Groups = ident.Groups
old.LastUsed = lastUsed
// ConnectorData has been moved to OfflineSession
old.ConnectorData = []byte{}
return old, nil
}
// Update LastUsed time stamp in refresh token reference object
// in offline session for the user.
if err := s.storage.UpdateOfflineSessions(refresh.Claims.UserID, refresh.ConnectorID, func(old storage.OfflineSessions) (storage.OfflineSessions, error) {
if old.Refresh[refresh.ClientID].ID != refresh.ID {
return old, errors.New("refresh token invalid")
}
old.Refresh[refresh.ClientID].LastUsed = lastUsed
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old.ConnectorData = ident.ConnectorData
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to update offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Update refresh token in the storage.
if err := s.storage.UpdateRefreshToken(refresh.ID, updater); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to update refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
}
resp := s.toAccessTokenResponse(idToken, accessToken, rawNewToken, expiry)
s.writeAccessToken(w, resp)
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}
func (s *Server) handleUserInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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auth := r.Header.Get("authorization")
if len(auth) < len(prefix) || !strings.EqualFold(prefix, auth[:len(prefix)]) {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errAccessDenied, "Invalid bearer token.", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
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rawIDToken := auth[len(prefix):]
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verifier := oidc.NewVerifier(s.issuerURL.String(), &storageKeySet{s.storage}, &oidc.Config{SkipClientIDCheck: true})
idToken, err := verifier.Verify(r.Context(), rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
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s.tokenErrHelper(w, errAccessDenied, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
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var claims json.RawMessage
if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Write(claims)
}
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func (s *Server) handlePasswordGrant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client storage.Client) {
// Parse the fields
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Couldn't parse data", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
q := r.Form
nonce := q.Get("nonce")
// Some clients, like the old go-oidc, provide extra whitespace. Tolerate this.
scopes := strings.Fields(q.Get("scope"))
// Parse the scopes if they are passed
var (
unrecognized []string
invalidScopes []string
)
hasOpenIDScope := false
for _, scope := range scopes {
switch scope {
case scopeOpenID:
hasOpenIDScope = true
case scopeOfflineAccess, scopeEmail, scopeProfile, scopeGroups, scopeFederatedID:
default:
peerID, ok := parseCrossClientScope(scope)
if !ok {
unrecognized = append(unrecognized, scope)
continue
}
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isTrusted, err := s.validateCrossClientTrust(client.ID, peerID)
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if err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidClient, fmt.Sprintf("Error validating cross client trust %v.", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !isTrusted {
invalidScopes = append(invalidScopes, scope)
}
}
}
if !hasOpenIDScope {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, `Missing required scope(s) ["openid"].`, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(unrecognized) > 0 {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Unrecognized scope(s) %q", unrecognized), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(invalidScopes) > 0 {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Client can't request scope(s) %q", invalidScopes), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Which connector
connID := s.passwordConnector
conn, err := s.getConnector(connID)
if err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Requested connector does not exist.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
passwordConnector, ok := conn.Connector.(connector.PasswordConnector)
if !ok {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Requested password connector does not correct type.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Login
username := q.Get("username")
password := q.Get("password")
identity, ok, err := passwordConnector.Login(r.Context(), parseScopes(scopes), username, password)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Failed to login user: %v", err)
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s.tokenErrHelper(w, errInvalidRequest, "Could not login user", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !ok {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errAccessDenied, "Invalid username or password", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Build the claims to send the id token
claims := storage.Claims{
UserID: identity.UserID,
Username: identity.Username,
PreferredUsername: identity.PreferredUsername,
Email: identity.Email,
EmailVerified: identity.EmailVerified,
Groups: identity.Groups,
}
accessToken := storage.NewID()
idToken, expiry, err := s.newIDToken(client.ID, claims, scopes, nonce, accessToken, connID)
if err != nil {
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, fmt.Sprintf("failed to create ID token: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
reqRefresh := func() bool {
// Ensure the connector supports refresh tokens.
//
// Connectors like `saml` do not implement RefreshConnector.
_, ok := conn.Connector.(connector.RefreshConnector)
if !ok {
return false
}
for _, scope := range scopes {
if scope == scopeOfflineAccess {
return true
}
}
return false
}()
var refreshToken string
if reqRefresh {
refresh := storage.RefreshToken{
ID: storage.NewID(),
Token: storage.NewID(),
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ClientID: client.ID,
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ConnectorID: connID,
Scopes: scopes,
Claims: claims,
Nonce: nonce,
// ConnectorData: authCode.ConnectorData,
CreatedAt: s.now(),
LastUsed: s.now(),
}
token := &internal.RefreshToken{
RefreshId: refresh.ID,
Token: refresh.Token,
}
if refreshToken, err = internal.Marshal(token); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := s.storage.CreateRefresh(refresh); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// deleteToken determines if we need to delete the newly created refresh token
// due to a failure in updating/creating the OfflineSession object for the
// corresponding user.
var deleteToken bool
defer func() {
if deleteToken {
// Delete newly created refresh token from storage.
if err := s.storage.DeleteRefresh(refresh.ID); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to delete refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
}()
tokenRef := storage.RefreshTokenRef{
ID: refresh.ID,
ClientID: refresh.ClientID,
CreatedAt: refresh.CreatedAt,
LastUsed: refresh.LastUsed,
}
// Try to retrieve an existing OfflineSession object for the corresponding user.
if session, err := s.storage.GetOfflineSessions(refresh.Claims.UserID, refresh.ConnectorID); err != nil {
if err != storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to get offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return
}
offlineSessions := storage.OfflineSessions{
UserID: refresh.Claims.UserID,
ConnID: refresh.ConnectorID,
Refresh: make(map[string]*storage.RefreshTokenRef),
}
offlineSessions.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
// Create a new OfflineSession object for the user and add a reference object for
// the newly received refreshtoken.
if err := s.storage.CreateOfflineSessions(offlineSessions); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to create offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return
}
} else {
if oldTokenRef, ok := session.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID]; ok {
// Delete old refresh token from storage.
if err := s.storage.DeleteRefresh(oldTokenRef.ID); err != nil {
if err == storage.ErrNotFound {
s.logger.Warnf("database inconsistent, refresh token missing: %v", oldTokenRef.ID)
} else {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to delete refresh token: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return
}
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}
}
// Update existing OfflineSession obj with new RefreshTokenRef.
if err := s.storage.UpdateOfflineSessions(session.UserID, session.ConnID, func(old storage.OfflineSessions) (storage.OfflineSessions, error) {
old.Refresh[tokenRef.ClientID] = &tokenRef
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to update offline session: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
deleteToken = true
return
}
}
}
resp := s.toAccessTokenResponse(idToken, accessToken, refreshToken, expiry)
s.writeAccessToken(w, resp)
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}
type accessTokenResponse struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
TokenType string `json:"token_type"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token,omitempty"`
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
}
func (s *Server) toAccessTokenResponse(idToken, accessToken, refreshToken string, expiry time.Time) *accessTokenResponse {
return &accessTokenResponse{
accessToken,
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"bearer",
int(expiry.Sub(s.now()).Seconds()),
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refreshToken,
idToken,
}
}
func (s *Server) writeAccessToken(w http.ResponseWriter, resp *accessTokenResponse) {
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data, err := json.Marshal(resp)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal access token response: %v", err)
s.tokenErrHelper(w, errServerError, "", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(data)))
// Token response must include cache headers https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")
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w.Write(data)
}
func (s *Server) renderError(r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, status int, description string) {
if err := s.templates.err(r, w, status, description); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("Server template error: %v", err)
}
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}
func (s *Server) tokenErrHelper(w http.ResponseWriter, typ string, description string, statusCode int) {
if err := tokenErr(w, typ, description, statusCode); err != nil {
s.logger.Errorf("token error response: %v", err)
}
}
// Check for username prompt override from connector. Defaults to "Username".
func usernamePrompt(conn connector.PasswordConnector) string {
if attr := conn.Prompt(); attr != "" {
return attr
}
return "Username"
}