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dex/connector/saml/saml.go

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// Package saml contains login methods for SAML.
package saml
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/pem"
"encoding/xml"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/beevik/etree"
dsig "github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig"
"github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig/etreeutils"
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"github.com/coreos/dex/connector"
)
const (
bindingRedirect = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect"
bindingPOST = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
nameIDFormatEmailAddress = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"
nameIDFormatUnspecified = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified"
nameIDFormatX509Subject = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName"
nameIDFormatWindowsDN = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:WindowsDomainQualifiedName"
nameIDFormatEncrypted = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:encrypted"
nameIDFormatEntity = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity"
nameIDFormatKerberos = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:kerberos"
nameIDFormatPersistent = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent"
nameIDformatTransient = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient"
// top level status codes
statusCodeSuccess = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"
// subject confirmation methods
subjectConfirmationMethodBearer = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"
// allowed clock drift for timestamp validation
allowedClockDrift = time.Duration(30) * time.Second
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)
var (
nameIDFormats = []string{
nameIDFormatEmailAddress,
nameIDFormatUnspecified,
nameIDFormatX509Subject,
nameIDFormatWindowsDN,
nameIDFormatEncrypted,
nameIDFormatEntity,
nameIDFormatKerberos,
nameIDFormatPersistent,
nameIDformatTransient,
}
nameIDFormatLookup = make(map[string]string)
)
func init() {
suffix := func(s, sep string) string {
if i := strings.LastIndex(s, sep); i > 0 {
return s[i+1:]
}
return s
}
for _, format := range nameIDFormats {
nameIDFormatLookup[suffix(format, ":")] = format
nameIDFormatLookup[format] = format
}
}
// Config represents configuration options for the SAML provider.
type Config struct {
// TODO(ericchiang): A bunch of these fields could be auto-filled if
// we supported SAML metadata discovery.
//
// https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/35391/sstc-saml-metadata-errata-2.0-wd-04-diff.pdf
EntityIssuer string `json:"entityIssuer"`
SSOIssuer string `json:"ssoIssuer"`
SSOURL string `json:"ssoURL"`
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// X509 CA file or raw data to verify XML signatures.
CA string `json:"ca"`
CAData []byte `json:"caData"`
InsecureSkipSignatureValidation bool `json:"insecureSkipSignatureValidation"`
// Assertion attribute names to lookup various claims with.
UsernameAttr string `json:"usernameAttr"`
EmailAttr string `json:"emailAttr"`
GroupsAttr string `json:"groupsAttr"`
// If GroupsDelim is supplied the connector assumes groups are returned as a
// single string instead of multiple attribute values. This delimiter will be
// used split the groups string.
GroupsDelim string `json:"groupsDelim"`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirectURI"`
// Requested format of the NameID. The NameID value is is mapped to the ID Token
// 'sub' claim.
//
// This can be an abbreviated form of the full URI with just the last component. For
// example, if this value is set to "emailAddress" the format will resolve to:
//
// urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress
//
// If no value is specified, this value defaults to:
//
// urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent
//
NameIDPolicyFormat string `json:"nameIDPolicyFormat"`
}
type certStore struct {
certs []*x509.Certificate
}
func (c certStore) Certificates() (roots []*x509.Certificate, err error) {
return c.certs, nil
}
// Open validates the config and returns a connector. It does not actually
// validate connectivity with the provider.
func (c *Config) Open(logger logrus.FieldLogger) (connector.Connector, error) {
return c.openConnector(logger)
}
func (c *Config) openConnector(logger logrus.FieldLogger) (*provider, error) {
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requiredFields := []struct {
name, val string
}{
{"ssoURL", c.SSOURL},
{"usernameAttr", c.UsernameAttr},
{"emailAttr", c.EmailAttr},
{"redirectURI", c.RedirectURI},
}
var missing []string
for _, f := range requiredFields {
if f.val == "" {
missing = append(missing, f.name)
}
}
switch len(missing) {
case 0:
case 1:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required field %q", missing[0])
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required fields %q", missing)
}
p := &provider{
entityIssuer: c.EntityIssuer,
ssoIssuer: c.SSOIssuer,
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ssoURL: c.SSOURL,
now: time.Now,
usernameAttr: c.UsernameAttr,
emailAttr: c.EmailAttr,
groupsAttr: c.GroupsAttr,
groupsDelim: c.GroupsDelim,
redirectURI: c.RedirectURI,
logger: logger,
nameIDPolicyFormat: c.NameIDPolicyFormat,
}
if p.nameIDPolicyFormat == "" {
p.nameIDPolicyFormat = nameIDFormatPersistent
} else {
if format, ok := nameIDFormatLookup[p.nameIDPolicyFormat]; ok {
p.nameIDPolicyFormat = format
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid nameIDPolicyFormat: %q", p.nameIDPolicyFormat)
}
}
if !c.InsecureSkipSignatureValidation {
if (c.CA == "") == (c.CAData == nil) {
return nil, errors.New("must provide either 'ca' or 'caData'")
}
var caData []byte
if c.CA != "" {
data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(c.CA)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read ca file: %v", err)
}
caData = data
} else {
caData = c.CAData
}
var (
certs []*x509.Certificate
block *pem.Block
)
for {
block, caData = pem.Decode(caData)
if block == nil {
break
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse cert: %v", err)
}
certs = append(certs, cert)
}
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("no certificates found in ca data")
}
p.validator = dsig.NewDefaultValidationContext(certStore{certs})
}
return p, nil
}
type provider struct {
entityIssuer string
ssoIssuer string
ssoURL string
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now func() time.Time
// If nil, don't do signature validation.
validator *dsig.ValidationContext
// Attribute mappings
usernameAttr string
emailAttr string
groupsAttr string
groupsDelim string
redirectURI string
nameIDPolicyFormat string
logger logrus.FieldLogger
}
func (p *provider) POSTData(s connector.Scopes, id string) (action, value string, err error) {
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r := &authnRequest{
ProtocolBinding: bindingPOST,
ID: id,
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IssueInstant: xmlTime(p.now()),
Destination: p.ssoURL,
NameIDPolicy: &nameIDPolicy{
AllowCreate: true,
Format: p.nameIDPolicyFormat,
},
AssertionConsumerServiceURL: p.redirectURI,
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}
if p.entityIssuer != "" {
// Issuer for the request is optional. For example, okta always ignores
// this value.
r.Issuer = &issuer{Issuer: p.entityIssuer}
}
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data, err := xml.MarshalIndent(r, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("marshal authn request: %v", err)
}
// See: https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf
// "3.5.4 Message Encoding"
return p.ssoURL, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(data), nil
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}
func (p *provider) HandlePOST(s connector.Scopes, samlResponse, inResponseTo string) (ident connector.Identity, err error) {
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rawResp, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(samlResponse)
if err != nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("decode response: %v", err)
}
rootElementSigned := true
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if p.validator != nil {
rawResp, rootElementSigned, err = verifyResponseSig(p.validator, rawResp)
if err != nil {
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return ident, fmt.Errorf("verify signature: %v", err)
}
}
var resp response
if err := xml.Unmarshal(rawResp, &resp); err != nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal response: %v", err)
}
if rootElementSigned {
if p.ssoIssuer != "" && resp.Issuer != nil && resp.Issuer.Issuer != p.ssoIssuer {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected Issuer value %s, got %s", p.entityIssuer, resp.Issuer.Issuer)
}
// Verify InResponseTo value matches the expected ID associated with
// the RelayState.
if resp.InResponseTo != inResponseTo {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected InResponseTo value %s, got %s", inResponseTo, resp.InResponseTo)
}
// Destination is optional.
if resp.Destination != "" && resp.Destination != p.redirectURI {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("expected destination %q got %q", p.redirectURI, resp.Destination)
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}
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if err = p.validateStatus(&resp); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
}
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assertion := resp.Assertion
if assertion == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain an assertion")
}
subject := assertion.Subject
if subject == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a subject")
}
if err = p.validateConditions(assertion); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
if err = p.validateSubjectConfirmation(subject); err != nil {
return ident, err
}
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switch {
case subject.NameID != nil:
if ident.UserID = subject.NameID.Value; ident.UserID == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("NameID element does not contain a value")
}
default:
return ident, fmt.Errorf("subject does not contain an NameID element")
}
attributes := assertion.AttributeStatement
if attributes == nil {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a AttributeStatement")
}
if ident.Email, _ = attributes.get(p.emailAttr); ident.Email == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.emailAttr, attributes.names())
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}
ident.EmailVerified = true
if ident.Username, _ = attributes.get(p.usernameAttr); ident.Username == "" {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.usernameAttr, attributes.names())
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}
if s.Groups && p.groupsAttr != "" {
if p.groupsDelim != "" {
groupsStr, ok := attributes.get(p.groupsAttr)
if !ok {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.groupsAttr, attributes.names())
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}
// TODO(ericchiang): Do we need to further trim whitespace?
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ident.Groups = strings.Split(groupsStr, p.groupsDelim)
} else {
groups, ok := attributes.all(p.groupsAttr)
if !ok {
return ident, fmt.Errorf("no attribute with name %q: %s", p.groupsAttr, attributes.names())
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}
ident.Groups = groups
}
}
return ident, nil
}
// Validate that the StatusCode of the Response is success.
// Otherwise return a human readable message to the end user
func (p *provider) validateStatus(resp *response) error {
// Status is mandatory in the Response type
status := resp.Status
if status == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a Status")
}
// StatusCode is mandatory in the Status type
statusCode := status.StatusCode
if statusCode == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("response did not contain a StatusCode")
}
if statusCode.Value != statusCodeSuccess {
parts := strings.Split(statusCode.Value, ":")
lastPart := parts[len(parts)-1]
errorMessage := fmt.Sprintf("status code of the Response was not Success, was %q", lastPart)
statusMessage := status.StatusMessage
if statusMessage != nil && statusMessage.Value != "" {
errorMessage += " -> " + statusMessage.Value
}
return fmt.Errorf(errorMessage)
}
return nil
}
// Multiple subject SubjectConfirmation can be in the assertion
// and at least one SubjectConfirmation must be valid.
// This is described in the spec "Profiles for the OASIS Security
// Assertion Markup Language" in section 3.3 Bearer.
// see https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/35389/sstc-saml-profiles-errata-2.0-wd-06-diff.pdf
func (p *provider) validateSubjectConfirmation(subject *subject) error {
validSubjectConfirmation := false
subjectConfirmations := subject.SubjectConfirmations
if subjectConfirmations != nil && len(subjectConfirmations) > 0 {
for _, subjectConfirmation := range subjectConfirmations {
// skip if method is wrong
method := subjectConfirmation.Method
if method != "" && method != subjectConfirmationMethodBearer {
continue
}
subjectConfirmationData := subjectConfirmation.SubjectConfirmationData
if subjectConfirmationData == nil {
continue
}
inResponseTo := subjectConfirmationData.InResponseTo
if inResponseTo != "" {
// TODO also validate InResponseTo if present
}
// only validate that subjectConfirmationData is not expired
now := p.now()
notOnOrAfter := time.Time(subjectConfirmationData.NotOnOrAfter)
if !notOnOrAfter.IsZero() {
if now.After(notOnOrAfter) {
continue
}
}
// validate recipient if present
recipient := subjectConfirmationData.Recipient
if recipient != "" && recipient != p.redirectURI {
continue
}
validSubjectConfirmation = true
}
}
if !validSubjectConfirmation {
return fmt.Errorf("no valid SubjectConfirmation was found on this Response")
}
return nil
}
// Validates the Conditions element and all of it's content
//
// See: https://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
// "2.3.3 Element <Assertion>"
func (p *provider) validateConditions(assertion *assertion) error {
// Checks if a Conditions element exists
conditions := assertion.Conditions
if conditions == nil {
return nil
}
// Validates Assertion timestamps
now := p.now()
notBefore := time.Time(conditions.NotBefore)
if !notBefore.IsZero() {
if now.Add(allowedClockDrift).Before(notBefore) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed before %s", now, notBefore)
}
}
notOnOrAfter := time.Time(conditions.NotOnOrAfter)
if !notOnOrAfter.IsZero() {
if now.After(notOnOrAfter.Add(allowedClockDrift)) {
return fmt.Errorf("at %s got response that cannot be processed because it expired at %s", now, notOnOrAfter)
}
}
// Validates audience
audienceValue := p.entityIssuer
if audienceValue == "" {
audienceValue = p.redirectURI
}
audienceRestriction := conditions.AudienceRestriction
if audienceRestriction != nil {
audiences := audienceRestriction.Audiences
if audiences != nil && len(audiences) > 0 {
values := make([]string, len(audiences))
issuerInAudiences := false
for i, audience := range audiences {
if audience.Value == audienceValue {
issuerInAudiences = true
break
}
values[i] = audience.Value
}
if !issuerInAudiences {
return fmt.Errorf("required audience %s was not in Response audiences %s", audienceValue, values)
}
}
}
return nil
}
// verifyResponseSig attempts to verify the signature of a SAML response or
// the assertion.
//
// If the root element is properly signed, this method returns it.
//
// The SAML spec requires supporting responses where the root element is
// unverified, but the sub <Assertion> elements are signed. In these cases,
// this method returns rootVerified=false to indicate that the <Assertion>
// elements should be trusted, but all other elements MUST be ignored.
//
// Note: we still don't support multiple <Assertion> tags. If there are
// multiple present this code will only process the first.
func verifyResponseSig(validator *dsig.ValidationContext, data []byte) (signed []byte, rootVerified bool, err error) {
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doc := etree.NewDocument()
if err = doc.ReadFromBytes(data); err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("parse document: %v", err)
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}
response := doc.Root()
transformedResponse, err := validator.Validate(response)
if err == nil {
// Root element is verified, return it.
doc.SetRoot(transformedResponse)
signed, err = doc.WriteToBytes()
return signed, true, err
}
// Ensures xmlns are copied down to the assertion element when they are defined in the root
//
// TODO: Only select from child elements of the root.
assertion, err := etreeutils.NSSelectOne(response, "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion", "Assertion")
if err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("response does not contain an Assertion element")
}
transformedAssertion, err := validator.Validate(assertion)
if err != nil {
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("response does not contain a valid signature element: %v", err)
}
// Verified an assertion but not the response. Can't trust any child elements,
// except the assertion. Remove them all.
for _, el := range response.ChildElements() {
response.RemoveChild(el)
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}
// We still return the full <Response> element, even though it's unverified
// because the <Assertion> element is not a valid XML document on its own.
// It still requires the root element to define things like namespaces.
response.AddChild(transformedAssertion)
signed, err = doc.WriteToBytes()
return signed, false, err
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}
func uuidv4() string {
u := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(u); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
u[6] = (u[6] | 0x40) & 0x4F
u[8] = (u[8] | 0x80) & 0xBF
r := make([]byte, 36)
r[8] = '-'
r[13] = '-'
r[18] = '-'
r[23] = '-'
hex.Encode(r, u[0:4])
hex.Encode(r[9:], u[4:6])
hex.Encode(r[14:], u[6:8])
hex.Encode(r[19:], u[8:10])
hex.Encode(r[24:], u[10:])
return string(r)
}