package server import ( "context" "crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/sha512" "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" "hash" "io" "net" "net/http" "net/url" "strconv" "strings" "time" jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2" "github.com/dexidp/dex/connector" "github.com/dexidp/dex/server/internal" "github.com/dexidp/dex/storage" ) // TODO(ericchiang): clean this file up and figure out more idiomatic error handling. // See: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2.1 // displayedAuthErr is an error that should be displayed to the user as a web page type displayedAuthErr struct { Status int Description string } func (err *displayedAuthErr) Error() string { return err.Description } func newDisplayedErr(status int, format string, a ...interface{}) *displayedAuthErr { return &displayedAuthErr{status, fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)} } // redirectedAuthErr is an error that should be reported back to the client by 302 redirect type redirectedAuthErr struct { State string RedirectURI string Type string Description string } func (err *redirectedAuthErr) Error() string { return err.Description } func (err *redirectedAuthErr) Handler() http.Handler { hf := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { v := url.Values{} v.Add("state", err.State) v.Add("error", err.Type) if err.Description != "" { v.Add("error_description", err.Description) } var redirectURI string if strings.Contains(err.RedirectURI, "?") { redirectURI = err.RedirectURI + "&" + v.Encode() } else { redirectURI = err.RedirectURI + "?" + v.Encode() } http.Redirect(w, r, redirectURI, http.StatusSeeOther) } return http.HandlerFunc(hf) } func tokenErr(w http.ResponseWriter, typ, description string, statusCode int) error { data := struct { Error string `json:"error"` Description string `json:"error_description,omitempty"` }{typ, description} body, err := json.Marshal(data) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal token error response: %v", err) } w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body))) w.WriteHeader(statusCode) w.Write(body) return nil } // nolint const ( errInvalidRequest = "invalid_request" errUnauthorizedClient = "unauthorized_client" errAccessDenied = "access_denied" errUnsupportedResponseType = "unsupported_response_type" errRequestNotSupported = "request_not_supported" errInvalidScope = "invalid_scope" errServerError = "server_error" errTemporarilyUnavailable = "temporarily_unavailable" errUnsupportedGrantType = "unsupported_grant_type" errInvalidGrant = "invalid_grant" errInvalidClient = "invalid_client" ) const ( scopeOfflineAccess = "offline_access" // Request a refresh token. scopeOpenID = "openid" scopeGroups = "groups" scopeEmail = "email" scopeProfile = "profile" scopeFederatedID = "federated:id" scopeCrossClientPrefix = "audience:server:client_id:" ) const ( deviceCallbackURI = "/device/callback" ) const ( redirectURIOOB = "urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob" ) const ( grantTypeAuthorizationCode = "authorization_code" grantTypeRefreshToken = "refresh_token" grantTypePassword = "password" grantTypeDeviceCode = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code" ) const ( responseTypeCode = "code" // "Regular" flow responseTypeToken = "token" // Implicit flow for frontend apps. responseTypeIDToken = "id_token" // ID Token in url fragment ) const ( deviceTokenPending = "authorization_pending" deviceTokenComplete = "complete" deviceTokenSlowDown = "slow_down" deviceTokenExpired = "expired_token" ) func parseScopes(scopes []string) connector.Scopes { var s connector.Scopes for _, scope := range scopes { switch scope { case scopeOfflineAccess: s.OfflineAccess = true case scopeGroups: s.Groups = true } } return s } // Determine the signature algorithm for a JWT. func signatureAlgorithm(jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) (alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, err error) { if jwk.Key == nil { return alg, errors.New("no signing key") } switch key := jwk.Key.(type) { case *rsa.PrivateKey: // Because OIDC mandates that we support RS256, we always return that // value. In the future, we might want to make this configurable on a // per client basis. For example allowing PS256 or ECDSA variants. // // See https://github.com/dexidp/dex/issues/692 return jose.RS256, nil case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: // We don't actually support ECDSA keys yet, but they're tested for // in case we want to in the future. // // These values are prescribed depending on the ECDSA key type. We // can't return different values. switch key.Params() { case elliptic.P256().Params(): return jose.ES256, nil case elliptic.P384().Params(): return jose.ES384, nil case elliptic.P521().Params(): return jose.ES512, nil default: return alg, errors.New("unsupported ecdsa curve") } default: return alg, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signing key type %T", key) } } func signPayload(key *jose.JSONWebKey, alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, payload []byte) (jws string, err error) { signingKey := jose.SigningKey{Key: key, Algorithm: alg} signer, err := jose.NewSigner(signingKey, &jose.SignerOptions{}) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("new signer: %v", err) } signature, err := signer.Sign(payload) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("signing payload: %v", err) } return signature.CompactSerialize() } // The hash algorithm for the at_hash is determined by the signing // algorithm used for the id_token. From the spec: // // ...the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm used in the alg Header // Parameter of the ID Token's JOSE Header. For instance, if the alg is RS256, // hash the access_token value with SHA-256 // // https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitIDToken var hashForSigAlg = map[jose.SignatureAlgorithm]func() hash.Hash{ jose.RS256: sha256.New, jose.RS384: sha512.New384, jose.RS512: sha512.New, jose.ES256: sha256.New, jose.ES384: sha512.New384, jose.ES512: sha512.New, } // Compute an at_hash from a raw access token and a signature algorithm // // See: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitIDToken func accessTokenHash(alg jose.SignatureAlgorithm, accessToken string) (string, error) { newHash, ok := hashForSigAlg[alg] if !ok { return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %s", alg) } hashFunc := newHash() if _, err := io.WriteString(hashFunc, accessToken); err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("computing hash: %v", err) } sum := hashFunc.Sum(nil) return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:len(sum)/2]), nil } type audience []string func (a audience) contains(aud string) bool { for _, e := range a { if aud == e { return true } } return false } func (a audience) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { if len(a) == 1 { return json.Marshal(a[0]) } return json.Marshal([]string(a)) } type idTokenClaims struct { Issuer string `json:"iss"` Subject string `json:"sub"` Audience audience `json:"aud"` Expiry int64 `json:"exp"` IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"` AuthorizingParty string `json:"azp,omitempty"` Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"` AccessTokenHash string `json:"at_hash,omitempty"` CodeHash string `json:"c_hash,omitempty"` Email string `json:"email,omitempty"` EmailVerified *bool `json:"email_verified,omitempty"` Groups []string `json:"groups,omitempty"` Name string `json:"name,omitempty"` PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username,omitempty"` FederatedIDClaims *federatedIDClaims `json:"federated_claims,omitempty"` } type federatedIDClaims struct { ConnectorID string `json:"connector_id,omitempty"` UserID string `json:"user_id,omitempty"` } func (s *Server) newAccessToken(clientID string, claims storage.Claims, scopes []string, nonce, connID string) (accessToken string, err error) { idToken, _, err := s.newIDToken(clientID, claims, scopes, nonce, storage.NewID(), "", connID) return idToken, err } func (s *Server) newIDToken(clientID string, claims storage.Claims, scopes []string, nonce, accessToken, code, connID string) (idToken string, expiry time.Time, err error) { keys, err := s.storage.GetKeys() if err != nil { s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get keys: %v", err) return "", expiry, err } signingKey := keys.SigningKey if signingKey == nil { return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("no key to sign payload with") } signingAlg, err := signatureAlgorithm(signingKey) if err != nil { return "", expiry, err } issuedAt := s.now() expiry = issuedAt.Add(s.idTokensValidFor) sub := &internal.IDTokenSubject{ UserId: claims.UserID, ConnId: connID, } subjectString, err := internal.Marshal(sub) if err != nil { s.logger.Errorf("failed to marshal offline session ID: %v", err) return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal offline session ID: %v", err) } tok := idTokenClaims{ Issuer: s.issuerURL.String(), Subject: subjectString, Nonce: nonce, Expiry: expiry.Unix(), IssuedAt: issuedAt.Unix(), } if accessToken != "" { atHash, err := accessTokenHash(signingAlg, accessToken) if err != nil { s.logger.Errorf("error computing at_hash: %v", err) return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("error computing at_hash: %v", err) } tok.AccessTokenHash = atHash } if code != "" { cHash, err := accessTokenHash(signingAlg, code) if err != nil { s.logger.Errorf("error computing c_hash: %v", err) return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("error computing c_hash: #{err}") } tok.CodeHash = cHash } for _, scope := range scopes { switch { case scope == scopeEmail: tok.Email = claims.Email tok.EmailVerified = &claims.EmailVerified case scope == scopeGroups: tok.Groups = claims.Groups case scope == scopeProfile: tok.Name = claims.Username tok.PreferredUsername = claims.PreferredUsername case scope == scopeFederatedID: tok.FederatedIDClaims = &federatedIDClaims{ ConnectorID: connID, UserID: claims.UserID, } default: peerID, ok := parseCrossClientScope(scope) if !ok { // Ignore unknown scopes. These are already validated during the // initial auth request. continue } isTrusted, err := s.validateCrossClientTrust(clientID, peerID) if err != nil { return "", expiry, err } if !isTrusted { // TODO(ericchiang): propagate this error to the client. return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("peer (%s) does not trust client", peerID) } tok.Audience = append(tok.Audience, peerID) } } if len(tok.Audience) == 0 { // Client didn't ask for cross client audience. Set the current // client as the audience. tok.Audience = audience{clientID} } else { // Client asked for cross client audience: // if the current client was not requested explicitly if !tok.Audience.contains(clientID) { // by default it becomes one of entries in Audience tok.Audience = append(tok.Audience, clientID) } // The current client becomes the authorizing party. tok.AuthorizingParty = clientID } payload, err := json.Marshal(tok) if err != nil { return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("could not serialize claims: %v", err) } if idToken, err = signPayload(signingKey, signingAlg, payload); err != nil { return "", expiry, fmt.Errorf("failed to sign payload: %v", err) } return idToken, expiry, nil } // parse the initial request from the OAuth2 client. func (s *Server) parseAuthorizationRequest(r *http.Request) (*storage.AuthRequest, error) { if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil { return nil, newDisplayedErr(http.StatusBadRequest, "Failed to parse request.") } q := r.Form redirectURI, err := url.QueryUnescape(q.Get("redirect_uri")) if err != nil { return nil, newDisplayedErr(http.StatusBadRequest, "No redirect_uri provided.") } clientID := q.Get("client_id") state := q.Get("state") nonce := q.Get("nonce") connectorID := q.Get("connector_id") // Some clients, like the old go-oidc, provide extra whitespace. Tolerate this. scopes := strings.Fields(q.Get("scope")) responseTypes := strings.Fields(q.Get("response_type")) codeChallenge := q.Get("code_challenge") codeChallengeMethod := q.Get("code_challenge_method") if codeChallengeMethod == "" { codeChallengeMethod = codeChallengeMethodPlain } client, err := s.storage.GetClient(clientID) if err != nil { if err == storage.ErrNotFound { return nil, newDisplayedErr(http.StatusNotFound, "Invalid client_id (%q).", clientID) } s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get client: %v", err) return nil, newDisplayedErr(http.StatusInternalServerError, "Database error.") } if !validateRedirectURI(client, redirectURI) { return nil, newDisplayedErr(http.StatusBadRequest, "Unregistered redirect_uri (%q).", redirectURI) } if redirectURI == deviceCallbackURI && client.Public { redirectURI = s.issuerURL.Path + deviceCallbackURI } // From here on out, we want to redirect back to the client with an error. newRedirectedErr := func(typ, format string, a ...interface{}) *redirectedAuthErr { return &redirectedAuthErr{state, redirectURI, typ, fmt.Sprintf(format, a...)} } if connectorID != "" { connectors, err := s.storage.ListConnectors() if err != nil { s.logger.Errorf("Failed to list connectors: %v", err) return nil, newRedirectedErr(errServerError, "Unable to retrieve connectors") } if !validateConnectorID(connectors, connectorID) { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, "Invalid ConnectorID") } } // dex doesn't support request parameter and must return request_not_supported error // https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#6.1 if q.Get("request") != "" { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errRequestNotSupported, "Server does not support request parameter.") } if codeChallengeMethod != codeChallengeMethodS256 && codeChallengeMethod != codeChallengeMethodPlain { description := fmt.Sprintf("Unsupported PKCE challenge method (%q).", codeChallengeMethod) return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, description) } var ( unrecognized []string invalidScopes []string ) hasOpenIDScope := false for _, scope := range scopes { switch scope { case scopeOpenID: hasOpenIDScope = true case scopeOfflineAccess, scopeEmail, scopeProfile, scopeGroups, scopeFederatedID: default: peerID, ok := parseCrossClientScope(scope) if !ok { unrecognized = append(unrecognized, scope) continue } isTrusted, err := s.validateCrossClientTrust(clientID, peerID) if err != nil { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errServerError, "Internal server error.") } if !isTrusted { invalidScopes = append(invalidScopes, scope) } } } if !hasOpenIDScope { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidScope, `Missing required scope(s) ["openid"].`) } if len(unrecognized) > 0 { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidScope, "Unrecognized scope(s) %q", unrecognized) } if len(invalidScopes) > 0 { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidScope, "Client can't request scope(s) %q", invalidScopes) } var rt struct { code bool idToken bool token bool } for _, responseType := range responseTypes { switch responseType { case responseTypeCode: rt.code = true case responseTypeIDToken: rt.idToken = true case responseTypeToken: rt.token = true default: return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, "Invalid response type %q", responseType) } if !s.supportedResponseTypes[responseType] { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errUnsupportedResponseType, "Unsupported response type %q", responseType) } } if len(responseTypes) == 0 { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, "No response_type provided") } if rt.token && !rt.code && !rt.idToken { // "token" can't be provided by its own. // // https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#Authentication return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, "Response type 'token' must be provided with type 'id_token' and/or 'code'") } if !rt.code { // Either "id_token token" or "id_token" has been provided which implies the // implicit flow. Implicit flow requires a nonce value. // // https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitAuthRequest if nonce == "" { return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, "Response type 'token' requires a 'nonce' value.") } } if rt.token { if redirectURI == redirectURIOOB { err := fmt.Sprintf("Cannot use response type 'token' with redirect_uri '%s'.", redirectURIOOB) return nil, newRedirectedErr(errInvalidRequest, err) } } return &storage.AuthRequest{ ID: storage.NewID(), ClientID: client.ID, State: state, Nonce: nonce, ForceApprovalPrompt: q.Get("approval_prompt") == "force", Scopes: scopes, RedirectURI: redirectURI, ResponseTypes: responseTypes, ConnectorID: connectorID, PKCE: storage.PKCE{ CodeChallenge: codeChallenge, CodeChallengeMethod: codeChallengeMethod, }, }, nil } func parseCrossClientScope(scope string) (peerID string, ok bool) { if ok = strings.HasPrefix(scope, scopeCrossClientPrefix); ok { peerID = scope[len(scopeCrossClientPrefix):] } return } func (s *Server) validateCrossClientTrust(clientID, peerID string) (trusted bool, err error) { if peerID == clientID { return true, nil } peer, err := s.storage.GetClient(peerID) if err != nil { if err != storage.ErrNotFound { s.logger.Errorf("Failed to get client: %v", err) return false, err } return false, nil } for _, id := range peer.TrustedPeers { if id == clientID { return true, nil } } return false, nil } func validateRedirectURI(client storage.Client, redirectURI string) bool { // Allow named RedirectURIs for both public and non-public clients. // This is required make PKCE-enabled web apps work, when configured as public clients. for _, uri := range client.RedirectURIs { if redirectURI == uri { return true } } // For non-public clients or when RedirectURIs is set, we allow only explicitly named RedirectURIs. // Otherwise, we check below for special URIs used for desktop or mobile apps. if !client.Public || len(client.RedirectURIs) > 0 { return false } if redirectURI == redirectURIOOB || redirectURI == deviceCallbackURI { return true } // verify that the host is of form "http://localhost:(port)(path)" or "http://localhost(path)" u, err := url.Parse(redirectURI) if err != nil { return false } if u.Scheme != "http" { return false } if u.Host == "localhost" { return true } host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(u.Host) return err == nil && host == "localhost" } func validateConnectorID(connectors []storage.Connector, connectorID string) bool { for _, c := range connectors { if c.ID == connectorID { return true } } return false } // storageKeySet implements the oidc.KeySet interface backed by Dex storage type storageKeySet struct { storage.Storage } func (s *storageKeySet) VerifySignature(_ context.Context, jwt string) (payload []byte, err error) { jws, err := jose.ParseSigned(jwt) if err != nil { return nil, err } keyID := "" for _, sig := range jws.Signatures { keyID = sig.Header.KeyID break } skeys, err := s.Storage.GetKeys() if err != nil { return nil, err } keys := []*jose.JSONWebKey{skeys.SigningKeyPub} for _, vk := range skeys.VerificationKeys { keys = append(keys, vk.PublicKey) } for _, key := range keys { if keyID == "" || key.KeyID == keyID { if payload, err := jws.Verify(key); err == nil { return payload, nil } } } return nil, errors.New("failed to verify id token signature") }