dex/server/server_test.go

1638 lines
48 KiB
Go
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package server
import (
"context"
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"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
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"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"os"
"path"
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"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
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"testing"
"time"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
"github.com/kylelemons/godebug/pretty"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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"golang.org/x/oauth2"
jose "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
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"github.com/dexidp/dex/connector"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/connector/mock"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/memory"
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)
func mustLoad(s string) *rsa.PrivateKey {
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(s))
if block == nil {
panic("no pem data found")
}
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return key
}
var testKey = mustLoad(`-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEogIBAAKCAQEArmoiX5G36MKPiVGS1sicruEaGRrbhPbIKOf97aGGQRjXVngo
Knwd2L4T9CRyABgQm3tLHHcT5crODoy46wX2g9onTZWViWWuhJ5wxXNmUbCAPWHb
j9SunW53WuLYZ/IJLNZt5XYCAFPjAakWp8uMuuDwWo5EyFaw85X3FSMhVmmaYDd0
cn+1H4+NS/52wX7tWmyvGUNJ8lzjFAnnOtBJByvkyIC7HDphkLQV4j//sMNY1mPX
HbsYgFv2J/LIJtkjdYO2UoDhZG3Gvj16fMy2JE2owA8IX4/s+XAmA2PiTfd0J5b4
drAKEcdDl83G6L3depEkTkfvp0ZLsh9xupAvIwIDAQABAoIBABKGgWonPyKA7+AF
AxS/MC0/CZebC6/+ylnV8lm4K1tkuRKdJp8EmeL4pYPsDxPFepYZLWwzlbB1rxdK
iSWld36fwEb0WXLDkxrQ/Wdrj3Wjyqs6ZqjLTVS5dAH6UEQSKDlT+U5DD4lbX6RA
goCGFUeQNtdXfyTMWHU2+4yKM7NKzUpczFky+0d10Mg0ANj3/4IILdr3hqkmMSI9
1TB9ksWBXJxt3nGxAjzSFihQFUlc231cey/HhYbvAX5fN0xhLxOk88adDcdXE7br
3Ser1q6XaaFQSMj4oi1+h3RAT9MUjJ6johEqjw0PbEZtOqXvA1x5vfFdei6SqgKn
Am3BspkCgYEA2lIiKEkT/Je6ZH4Omhv9atbGoBdETAstL3FnNQjkyVau9f6bxQkl
4/sz985JpaiasORQBiTGY8JDT/hXjROkut91agi2Vafhr29L/mto7KZglfDsT4b2
9z/EZH8wHw7eYhvdoBbMbqNDSI8RrGa4mpLpuN+E0wsFTzSZEL+QMQUCgYEAzIQh
xnreQvDAhNradMqLmxRpayn1ORaPReD4/off+mi7hZRLKtP0iNgEVEWHJ6HEqqi1
r38XAc8ap/lfOVMar2MLyCFOhYspdHZ+TGLZfr8gg/Fzeq9IRGKYadmIKVwjMeyH
REPqg1tyrvMOE0HI5oqkko8JTDJ0OyVC0Vc6+AcCgYAqCzkywugLc/jcU35iZVOH
WLdFq1Vmw5w/D7rNdtoAgCYPj6nV5y4Z2o2mgl6ifXbU7BMRK9Hc8lNeOjg6HfdS
WahV9DmRA1SuIWPkKjE5qczd81i+9AHpmakrpWbSBF4FTNKAewOBpwVVGuBPcDTK
59IE3V7J+cxa9YkotYuCNQKBgCwGla7AbHBEm2z+H+DcaUktD7R+B8gOTzFfyLoi
Tdj+CsAquDO0BQQgXG43uWySql+CifoJhc5h4v8d853HggsXa0XdxaWB256yk2Wm
MePTCRDePVm/ufLetqiyp1kf+IOaw1Oyux0j5oA62mDS3Iikd+EE4Z+BjPvefY/L
E2qpAoGAZo5Wwwk7q8b1n9n/ACh4LpE+QgbFdlJxlfFLJCKstl37atzS8UewOSZj
FDWV28nTP9sqbtsmU8Tem2jzMvZ7C/Q0AuDoKELFUpux8shm8wfIhyaPnXUGZoAZ
Np4vUwMSYV5mopESLWOg3loBxKyLGFtgGKVCjGiQvy6zISQ4fQo=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`)
var logger = &logrus.Logger{
Out: os.Stderr,
Formatter: &logrus.TextFormatter{DisableColors: true},
Level: logrus.DebugLevel,
}
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func newTestServer(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, updateConfig func(c *Config)) (*httptest.Server, *Server) {
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var server *Server
s := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
server.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}))
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config := Config{
Issuer: s.URL,
Storage: memory.New(logger),
Web: WebConfig{
Dir: "../web",
},
Logger: logger,
PrometheusRegistry: prometheus.NewRegistry(),
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}
if updateConfig != nil {
updateConfig(&config)
}
s.URL = config.Issuer
connector := storage.Connector{
ID: "mock",
Type: "mockCallback",
Name: "Mock",
ResourceVersion: "1",
}
if err := config.Storage.CreateConnector(connector); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create connector: %v", err)
}
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var err error
if server, err = newServer(ctx, config, staticRotationStrategy(testKey)); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
server.skipApproval = true // Don't prompt for approval, just immediately redirect with code.
return s, server
}
func newTestServerMultipleConnectors(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, updateConfig func(c *Config)) (*httptest.Server, *Server) {
var server *Server
s := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
server.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}))
config := Config{
Issuer: s.URL,
Storage: memory.New(logger),
Web: WebConfig{
Dir: "../web",
},
Logger: logger,
PrometheusRegistry: prometheus.NewRegistry(),
}
if updateConfig != nil {
updateConfig(&config)
}
s.URL = config.Issuer
connector := storage.Connector{
ID: "mock",
Type: "mockCallback",
Name: "Mock",
ResourceVersion: "1",
}
connector2 := storage.Connector{
ID: "mock2",
Type: "mockCallback",
Name: "Mock",
ResourceVersion: "1",
}
if err := config.Storage.CreateConnector(connector); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create connector: %v", err)
}
if err := config.Storage.CreateConnector(connector2); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create connector: %v", err)
}
var err error
if server, err = newServer(ctx, config, staticRotationStrategy(testKey)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
server.skipApproval = true // Don't prompt for approval, just immediately redirect with code.
return s, server
}
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func TestNewTestServer(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
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newTestServer(ctx, t, nil)
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}
func TestDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
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httpServer, _ := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Issuer += "/non-root-path"
})
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defer httpServer.Close()
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
var got map[string]*json.RawMessage
if err := p.Claims(&got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode claims: %v", err)
}
required := []string{
"issuer",
"authorization_endpoint",
"token_endpoint",
"jwks_uri",
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"userinfo_endpoint",
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}
for _, field := range required {
if _, ok := got[field]; !ok {
t.Errorf("server discovery is missing required field %q", field)
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}
}
}
type oauth2Tests struct {
clientID string
tests []test
}
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type test struct {
name string
// If specified these set of scopes will be used during the test case.
scopes []string
// handleToken provides the OAuth2 token response for the integration test.
handleToken func(context.Context, *oidc.Provider, *oauth2.Config, *oauth2.Token, *mock.Callback) error
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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// extra parameters to pass when requesting auth_code
authCodeOptions []oauth2.AuthCodeOption
// extra parameters to pass when retrieving id token
retrieveTokenOptions []oauth2.AuthCodeOption
// define an error response, when the test expects an error on the auth endpoint
authError *OAuth2ErrorResponse
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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// define an error response, when the test expects an error on the token endpoint
tokenError ErrorResponse
}
// Defines an expected error by HTTP Status Code and
// the OAuth2 error int the response json
type ErrorResponse struct {
Error string
StatusCode int
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
type OAuth2ErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
ErrorDescription string `json:"error_description"`
ErrorURI string `json:"error_uri"`
}
func makeOAuth2Tests(clientID string, clientSecret string, now func() time.Time) oauth2Tests {
requestedScopes := []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "profile", "groups", "offline_access"}
// Used later when configuring test servers to set how long id_tokens will be valid for.
//
// The actual value of 30s is completely arbitrary. We just need to set a value
// so tests can compute the expected "expires_in" field.
idTokensValidFor := time.Second * 30
oidcConfig := &oidc.Config{SkipClientIDCheck: true}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
basicIDTokenVerify := func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
idToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no id token found")
}
if _, err := p.Verifier(oidcConfig).Verify(ctx, idToken); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id token: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
return oauth2Tests{
clientID: clientID,
tests: []test{
{
name: "verify ID Token",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
idToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no id token found")
}
if _, err := p.Verifier(oidcConfig).Verify(ctx, idToken); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id token: %v", err)
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "fetch userinfo",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
ui, err := p.UserInfo(ctx, config.TokenSource(ctx, token))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch userinfo: %v", err)
}
if conn.Identity.Email != ui.Email {
return fmt.Errorf("expected email to be %v, got %v", conn.Identity.Email, ui.Email)
}
return nil
},
2019-06-20 22:45:59 +05:30
},
{
name: "verify id token and oauth2 token expiry",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
expectedExpiry := now().Add(idTokensValidFor)
timeEq := func(t1, t2 time.Time, within time.Duration) bool {
return t1.Sub(t2) < within
}
if !timeEq(token.Expiry, expectedExpiry, time.Second) {
return fmt.Errorf("expected expired_in to be %s, got %s", expectedExpiry, token.Expiry)
}
rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no id token found")
}
idToken, err := p.Verifier(oidcConfig).Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id token: %v", err)
}
if !timeEq(idToken.Expiry, expectedExpiry, time.Second) {
return fmt.Errorf("expected id token expiry to be %s, got %s", expectedExpiry, token.Expiry)
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "verify at_hash",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no id token found")
}
idToken, err := p.Verifier(oidcConfig).Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id token: %v", err)
}
var claims struct {
AtHash string `json:"at_hash"`
}
if err := idToken.Claims(&claims); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode raw claims: %v", err)
}
if claims.AtHash == "" {
return errors.New("no at_hash value in id_token")
}
wantAtHash, err := accessTokenHash(jose.RS256, token.AccessToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("computed expected at hash: %v", err)
}
if wantAtHash != claims.AtHash {
return fmt.Errorf("expected at_hash=%q got=%q", wantAtHash, claims.AtHash)
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "refresh token",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
// have to use time.Now because the OAuth2 package uses it.
token.Expiry = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -10)
if token.Valid() {
return errors.New("token shouldn't be valid")
}
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newToken, err := config.TokenSource(ctx, token).Token()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %v", err)
}
if token.RefreshToken == newToken.RefreshToken {
return fmt.Errorf("old refresh token was the same as the new token %q", token.RefreshToken)
}
if _, err := config.TokenSource(ctx, token).Token(); err == nil {
return errors.New("was able to redeem the same refresh token twice")
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "refresh with explicit scopes",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
v := url.Values{}
v.Add("client_id", clientID)
v.Add("client_secret", clientSecret)
v.Add("grant_type", "refresh_token")
v.Add("refresh_token", token.RefreshToken)
v.Add("scope", strings.Join(requestedScopes, " "))
resp, err := http.PostForm(p.Endpoint().TokenURL, v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
dump, err := httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected response: %s", dump)
}
if resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
return fmt.Errorf("cache-control header doesn't included in token response")
}
if resp.Header.Get("Pragma") != "no-cache" {
return fmt.Errorf("pragma header doesn't included in token response")
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "refresh with extra spaces",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
v := url.Values{}
v.Add("client_id", clientID)
v.Add("client_secret", clientSecret)
v.Add("grant_type", "refresh_token")
v.Add("refresh_token", token.RefreshToken)
// go-oidc adds an additional space before scopes when refreshing.
// Since we support that client we choose to be more relaxed about
// scope parsing, disregarding extra whitespace.
v.Add("scope", " "+strings.Join(requestedScopes, " "))
resp, err := http.PostForm(p.Endpoint().TokenURL, v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
dump, err := httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected response: %s", dump)
}
if resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
return fmt.Errorf("cache-control header doesn't included in token response")
}
if resp.Header.Get("Pragma") != "no-cache" {
return fmt.Errorf("pragma header doesn't included in token response")
}
return nil
},
},
{
name: "refresh with unauthorized scopes",
scopes: []string{"openid", "email"},
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
v := url.Values{}
v.Add("client_id", clientID)
v.Add("client_secret", clientSecret)
v.Add("grant_type", "refresh_token")
v.Add("refresh_token", token.RefreshToken)
// Request a scope that wasn't requested initially.
v.Add("scope", "oidc email profile")
resp, err := http.PostForm(p.Endpoint().TokenURL, v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
dump, err := httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected response: %s", dump)
}
return nil
},
},
{
// This test ensures that the connector.RefreshConnector interface is being
// used when clients request a refresh token.
name: "refresh with identity changes",
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
// have to use time.Now because the OAuth2 package uses it.
token.Expiry = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -10)
if token.Valid() {
return errors.New("token shouldn't be valid")
}
2016-11-22 01:46:36 +05:30
ident := connector.Identity{
UserID: "fooid",
Username: "foo",
Email: "foo@bar.com",
EmailVerified: true,
Groups: []string{"foo", "bar"},
}
conn.Identity = ident
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type claims struct {
Username string `json:"name"`
Email string `json:"email"`
EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
Groups []string `json:"groups"`
}
want := claims{ident.Username, ident.Email, ident.EmailVerified, ident.Groups}
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newToken, err := config.TokenSource(ctx, token).Token()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh token: %v", err)
}
rawIDToken, ok := newToken.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no id_token in refreshed token")
}
idToken, err := p.Verifier(oidcConfig).Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id token: %v", err)
}
var got claims
if err := idToken.Claims(&got); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal claims: %v", err)
}
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if diff := pretty.Compare(want, got); diff != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("got identity != want identity: %s", diff)
}
return nil
},
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},
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
{
// This test ensures that PKCE work in "plain" mode (no code_challenge_method specified)
name: "PKCE with plain",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "challenge123"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "challenge123"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
},
{
// This test ensures that PKCE works in "S256" mode
name: "PKCE with S256",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "lyyl-X4a69qrqgEfUL8wodWic3Be9ZZ5eovBgIKKi-w"),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "challenge123"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
},
{
// This test ensures that PKCE does fail with wrong code_verifier in "plain" mode
name: "PKCE with plain and wrong code_verifier",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "challenge123"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "challenge124"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
tokenError: ErrorResponse{
Error: errInvalidGrant,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
},
{
// This test ensures that PKCE fail with wrong code_verifier in "S256" mode
name: "PKCE with S256 and wrong code_verifier",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "lyyl-X4a69qrqgEfUL8wodWic3Be9ZZ5eovBgIKKi-w"),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "challenge124"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
tokenError: ErrorResponse{
Error: errInvalidGrant,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
},
{
// Ensure that, when PKCE flow started on /auth
// we stay in PKCE flow on /token
name: "PKCE flow expected on /token",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "lyyl-X4a69qrqgEfUL8wodWic3Be9ZZ5eovBgIKKi-w"),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
// No PKCE call on /token
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
tokenError: ErrorResponse{
Error: errInvalidGrant,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
},
{
// Ensure that when no PKCE flow was started on /auth
// we cannot switch to PKCE on /token
name: "No PKCE flow started on /auth",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
// No PKCE call on /auth
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "challenge123"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
tokenError: ErrorResponse{
Error: errInvalidRequest,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
},
{
// Make sure that, when we start with "S256" on /auth, we cannot downgrade to "plain" on /token
name: "PKCE with S256 and try to downgrade to plain",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge", "lyyl-X4a69qrqgEfUL8wodWic3Be9ZZ5eovBgIKKi-w"),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "S256"),
},
retrieveTokenOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", "lyyl-X4a69qrqgEfUL8wodWic3Be9ZZ5eovBgIKKi-w"),
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_challenge_method", "plain"),
},
handleToken: basicIDTokenVerify,
tokenError: ErrorResponse{
Error: errInvalidGrant,
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
},
{
name: "Request parameter in authorization query",
authCodeOptions: []oauth2.AuthCodeOption{
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("request", "anything"),
},
authError: &OAuth2ErrorResponse{
Error: errRequestNotSupported,
ErrorDescription: "Server does not support request parameter.",
},
handleToken: func(ctx context.Context, p *oidc.Provider, config *oauth2.Config, token *oauth2.Token, conn *mock.Callback) error {
return nil
},
},
2016-11-22 01:46:36 +05:30
},
}
}
// TestOAuth2CodeFlow runs integration tests against a test server. The tests stand up a server
// which requires no interaction to login, logs in through a test client, then passes the client
// and returned token to the test.
func TestOAuth2CodeFlow(t *testing.T) {
clientID := "testclient"
clientSecret := "testclientsecret"
requestedScopes := []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "profile", "groups", "offline_access"}
t0 := time.Now()
// Always have the time function used by the server return the same time so
// we can predict expected values of "expires_in" fields exactly.
now := func() time.Time { return t0 }
// Used later when configuring test servers to set how long id_tokens will be valid for.
//
// The actual value of 30s is completely arbitrary. We just need to set a value
// so tests can compute the expected "expires_in" field.
idTokensValidFor := time.Second * 30
// Connector used by the tests.
var conn *mock.Callback
tests := makeOAuth2Tests(clientID, clientSecret, now)
for _, tc := range tests.tests {
func() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Setup a dex server.
2016-10-14 06:45:20 +05:30
httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Issuer += "/non-root-path"
c.Now = now
c.IDTokensValidFor = idTokensValidFor
})
defer httpServer.Close()
mockConn := s.connectors["mock"]
conn = mockConn.Connector.(*mock.Callback)
// Query server's provider metadata.
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
}
var (
// If the OAuth2 client didn't get a response, we need
// to print the requests the user saw.
gotCode bool
reqDump, respDump []byte // Auth step, not token.
state = "a_state"
)
defer func() {
if !gotCode && tc.authError == nil {
t.Errorf("never got a code in callback\n%s\n%s", reqDump, respDump)
}
}()
2016-07-26 01:30:28 +05:30
// Setup OAuth2 client.
var oauth2Config *oauth2.Config
oauth2Client := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != "/callback" {
// User is visiting app first time. Redirect to dex.
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
http.Redirect(w, r, oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state, tc.authCodeOptions...), http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
// User is at '/callback' so they were just redirected _from_ dex.
q := r.URL.Query()
// Did dex return an error?
if errType := q.Get("error"); errType != "" {
description := q.Get("error_description")
if tc.authError == nil {
if description != "" {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s: %s", errType, description)
} else {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s", errType)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
require.Equal(t, *tc.authError, OAuth2ErrorResponse{Error: errType, ErrorDescription: description})
return
}
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// Grab code, exchange for token.
if code := q.Get("code"); code != "" {
gotCode = true
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
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token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(ctx, code, tc.retrieveTokenOptions...)
if tc.tokenError.StatusCode != 0 {
checkErrorResponse(err, t, tc)
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
return
}
err = tc.handleToken(ctx, p, oauth2Config, token, conn)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: %v", tc.name, err)
}
return
}
// Ensure state matches.
if gotState := q.Get("state"); gotState != state {
t.Errorf("state did not match, want=%q got=%q", state, gotState)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer oauth2Client.Close()
// Register the client above with dex.
redirectURL := oauth2Client.URL + "/callback"
client := storage.Client{
ID: clientID,
Secret: clientSecret,
RedirectURIs: []string{redirectURL},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
// Create the OAuth2 config.
oauth2Config = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: requestedScopes,
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
}
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if len(tc.scopes) != 0 {
oauth2Config.Scopes = tc.scopes
}
// Login!
//
// 1. First request to client, redirects to dex.
// 2. Dex "logs in" the user, redirects to client with "code".
// 3. Client exchanges "code" for "token" (id_token, refresh_token, etc.).
// 4. Test is run with OAuth2 token response.
//
resp, err := http.Get(oauth2Client.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
if reqDump, err = httputil.DumpRequest(resp.Request, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if respDump, err = httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}()
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}
}
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func TestOAuth2ImplicitFlow(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
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httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
// Enable support for the implicit flow.
c.SupportedResponseTypes = []string{"code", "token", "id_token"}
})
defer httpServer.Close()
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
var (
reqDump, respDump []byte
gotIDToken bool
state = "a_state"
nonce = "a_nonce"
)
defer func() {
if !gotIDToken {
t.Errorf("never got a id token in fragment\n%s\n%s", reqDump, respDump)
}
}()
var oauth2Config *oauth2.Config
oauth2Server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/callback" {
q := r.URL.Query()
if errType := q.Get("error"); errType != "" {
if desc := q.Get("error_description"); desc != "" {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s: %s", errType, desc)
} else {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s", errType)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Fragment is checked by the client since net/http servers don't preserve URL fragments.
// E.g.
//
// r.URL.Fragment
//
// Will always be empty.
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
u := oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state, oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("response_type", "id_token token"), oidc.Nonce(nonce))
http.Redirect(w, r, u, http.StatusSeeOther)
}))
defer oauth2Server.Close()
redirectURL := oauth2Server.URL + "/callback"
client := storage.Client{
ID: "testclient",
Secret: "testclientsecret",
RedirectURIs: []string{redirectURL},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
idTokenVerifier := p.Verifier(&oidc.Config{
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ClientID: client.ID,
})
oauth2Config = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "profile", "email", "offline_access"},
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
}
checkIDToken := func(u *url.URL) error {
if u.Fragment == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("url has no fragment: %s", u)
}
v, err := url.ParseQuery(u.Fragment)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse fragment: %v", err)
}
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rawIDToken := v.Get("id_token")
if rawIDToken == "" {
return errors.New("no id_token in fragment")
}
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idToken, err := idTokenVerifier.Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id_token: %v", err)
}
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if idToken.Nonce != nonce {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify id_token: nonce was %v, but want %v", idToken.Nonce, nonce)
}
return nil
}
httpClient := &http.Client{
// net/http servers don't preserve URL fragments when passing the request to
// handlers. The only way to get at that values is to check the redirect on
// the client side.
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) > 10 {
return errors.New("too many redirects")
}
// If we're being redirected back to the client server, inspect the URL fragment
// for an ID Token.
u := req.URL.String()
if strings.HasPrefix(u, oauth2Server.URL) {
if err := checkIDToken(req.URL); err == nil {
gotIDToken = true
} else {
t.Error(err)
}
}
return nil
},
}
resp, err := httpClient.Get(oauth2Server.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
if reqDump, err = httputil.DumpRequest(resp.Request, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if respDump, err = httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestCrossClientScopes(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
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httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Issuer += "/non-root-path"
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})
defer httpServer.Close()
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
var (
reqDump, respDump []byte
gotCode bool
state = "a_state"
)
defer func() {
if !gotCode {
t.Errorf("never got a code in callback\n%s\n%s", reqDump, respDump)
}
}()
testClientID := "testclient"
peerID := "peer"
var oauth2Config *oauth2.Config
oauth2Server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/callback" {
q := r.URL.Query()
if errType := q.Get("error"); errType != "" {
if desc := q.Get("error_description"); desc != "" {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s: %s", errType, desc)
} else {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s", errType)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if code := q.Get("code"); code != "" {
gotCode = true
token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(ctx, code)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
return
}
rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("no id token found: %v", err)
return
}
idToken, err := p.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: testClientID}).Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
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if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to parse ID Token: %v", err)
return
}
sort.Strings(idToken.Audience)
expAudience := []string{peerID, testClientID}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(idToken.Audience, expAudience) {
t.Errorf("expected audience %q, got %q", expAudience, idToken.Audience)
}
}
if gotState := q.Get("state"); gotState != state {
t.Errorf("state did not match, want=%q got=%q", state, gotState)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state), http.StatusSeeOther)
}))
defer oauth2Server.Close()
redirectURL := oauth2Server.URL + "/callback"
client := storage.Client{
ID: testClientID,
Secret: "testclientsecret",
RedirectURIs: []string{redirectURL},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
peer := storage.Client{
ID: peerID,
Secret: "foobar",
TrustedPeers: []string{"testclient"},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(peer); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
oauth2Config = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: []string{
oidc.ScopeOpenID, "profile", "email",
"audience:server:client_id:" + client.ID,
"audience:server:client_id:" + peer.ID,
},
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
}
resp, err := http.Get(oauth2Server.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if reqDump, err = httputil.DumpRequest(resp.Request, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if respDump, err = httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestCrossClientScopesWithAzpInAudienceByDefault(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Issuer += "/non-root-path"
})
defer httpServer.Close()
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
var (
reqDump, respDump []byte
gotCode bool
state = "a_state"
)
defer func() {
if !gotCode {
t.Errorf("never got a code in callback\n%s\n%s", reqDump, respDump)
}
}()
testClientID := "testclient"
peerID := "peer"
var oauth2Config *oauth2.Config
oauth2Server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/callback" {
q := r.URL.Query()
if errType := q.Get("error"); errType != "" {
if desc := q.Get("error_description"); desc != "" {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s: %s", errType, desc)
} else {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s", errType)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if code := q.Get("code"); code != "" {
gotCode = true
token, err := oauth2Config.Exchange(ctx, code)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
return
}
rawIDToken, ok := token.Extra("id_token").(string)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("no id token found: %v", err)
return
}
idToken, err := p.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: testClientID}).Verify(ctx, rawIDToken)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to parse ID Token: %v", err)
return
}
sort.Strings(idToken.Audience)
expAudience := []string{peerID, testClientID}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(idToken.Audience, expAudience) {
t.Errorf("expected audience %q, got %q", expAudience, idToken.Audience)
}
}
if gotState := q.Get("state"); gotState != state {
t.Errorf("state did not match, want=%q got=%q", state, gotState)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, oauth2Config.AuthCodeURL(state), http.StatusSeeOther)
}))
defer oauth2Server.Close()
redirectURL := oauth2Server.URL + "/callback"
client := storage.Client{
ID: testClientID,
Secret: "testclientsecret",
RedirectURIs: []string{redirectURL},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
peer := storage.Client{
ID: peerID,
Secret: "foobar",
TrustedPeers: []string{"testclient"},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(peer); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
oauth2Config = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: []string{
oidc.ScopeOpenID, "profile", "email",
"audience:server:client_id:" + peer.ID,
},
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
}
resp, err := http.Get(oauth2Server.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
if reqDump, err = httputil.DumpRequest(resp.Request, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if respDump, err = httputil.DumpResponse(resp, true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestPasswordDB(t *testing.T) {
s := memory.New(logger)
conn := newPasswordDB(s)
pw := "hi"
h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(pw), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s.CreatePassword(storage.Password{
Email: "jane@example.com",
Username: "jane",
UserID: "foobar",
Hash: h,
})
tests := []struct {
name string
username string
password string
wantIdentity connector.Identity
wantInvalid bool
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "valid password",
username: "jane@example.com",
password: pw,
wantIdentity: connector.Identity{
Email: "jane@example.com",
Username: "jane",
UserID: "foobar",
EmailVerified: true,
},
},
{
name: "unknown user",
username: "john@example.com",
password: pw,
wantInvalid: true,
},
{
name: "invalid password",
username: "jane@example.com",
password: "not the correct password",
wantInvalid: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
ident, valid, err := conn.Login(context.Background(), connector.Scopes{}, tc.username, tc.password)
if err != nil {
if !tc.wantErr {
t.Errorf("%s: %v", tc.name, err)
}
continue
}
if tc.wantErr {
t.Errorf("%s: expected error", tc.name)
continue
}
if !valid {
if !tc.wantInvalid {
t.Errorf("%s: expected valid password", tc.name)
}
continue
}
if tc.wantInvalid {
t.Errorf("%s: expected invalid password", tc.name)
continue
}
if diff := pretty.Compare(tc.wantIdentity, ident); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("%s: %s", tc.name, diff)
}
}
}
func TestPasswordDBUsernamePrompt(t *testing.T) {
s := memory.New(logger)
conn := newPasswordDB(s)
expected := "Email Address"
if actual := conn.Prompt(); actual != expected {
t.Errorf("expected %v, got %v", expected, actual)
}
}
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type storageWithKeysTrigger struct {
storage.Storage
f func()
}
func (s storageWithKeysTrigger) GetKeys() (storage.Keys, error) {
s.f()
return s.Storage.GetKeys()
}
func TestKeyCacher(t *testing.T) {
tNow := time.Now()
now := func() time.Time { return tNow }
s := memory.New(logger)
2016-08-11 09:21:58 +05:30
tests := []struct {
before func()
wantCallToStorage bool
}{
{
before: func() {},
wantCallToStorage: true,
},
{
before: func() {
s.UpdateKeys(func(old storage.Keys) (storage.Keys, error) {
old.NextRotation = tNow.Add(time.Minute)
return old, nil
})
},
wantCallToStorage: true,
},
{
before: func() {},
wantCallToStorage: false,
},
{
before: func() {
tNow = tNow.Add(time.Hour)
},
wantCallToStorage: true,
},
{
before: func() {
tNow = tNow.Add(time.Hour)
s.UpdateKeys(func(old storage.Keys) (storage.Keys, error) {
old.NextRotation = tNow.Add(time.Minute)
return old, nil
})
},
wantCallToStorage: true,
},
{
before: func() {},
wantCallToStorage: false,
},
}
gotCall := false
s = newKeyCacher(storageWithKeysTrigger{s, func() { gotCall = true }}, now)
for i, tc := range tests {
gotCall = false
tc.before()
s.GetKeys()
if gotCall != tc.wantCallToStorage {
t.Errorf("case %d: expected call to storage=%t got call to storage=%t", i, tc.wantCallToStorage, gotCall)
}
}
}
PKCE implementation (#1784) * Basic implementation of PKCE Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> * @mfmarche on 24 Feb: when code_verifier is set, don't check client_secret In PKCE flow, no client_secret is used, so the check for a valid client_secret would always fail. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * @deric on 16 Jun: return invalid_grant when wrong code_verifier Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enforce PKCE flow on /token when PKCE flow was started on /auth Also dissallow PKCE on /token, when PKCE flow was not started on /auth Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * fixed error messages when mixed PKCE/no PKCE flow. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * server_test.go: Added PKCE error cases on /token endpoint * Added test for invalid_grant, when wrong code_verifier is sent * Added test for mixed PKCE / no PKCE auth flows. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * cleanup: extracted method checkErrorResponse and type TestDefinition * fixed connector being overwritten Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * /token endpoint: skip client_secret verification only for grand type authorization_code with PKCE extension Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow "Authorization" header in CORS handlers * Adds "Authorization" to the default CORS headers{"Accept", "Accept-Language", "Content-Language", "Origin"} Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Add "code_challenge_methods_supported" to discovery endpoint discovery endpoint /dex/.well-known/openid-configuration now has the following entry: "code_challenge_methods_supported": [ "S256", "plain" ] Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Updated tests (mixed-up comments), added a PKCE test * @asoorm added test that checks if downgrade to "plain" on /token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * remove redefinition of providedCodeVerifier, fixed spelling (#6) Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <HEllRZA@users.noreply.github.com> * Rename struct CodeChallenge to PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * PKCE: Check clientSecret when available In authorization_code flow with PKCE, allow empty client_secret on /auth and /token endpoints. But check the client_secret when it is given. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Enable PKCE with public: true dex configuration public on staticClients now enables the following behavior in PKCE: - Public: false, PKCE will always check client_secret. This means PKCE in it's natural form is disabled. - Public: true, PKCE is enabled. It will only check client_secret if the client has sent one. But it allows the code flow if the client didn't sent one. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Redirect error on unsupported code_challenge_method - Check for unsupported code_challenge_method after redirect uri is validated, and use newErr() to return the error. - Add PKCE tests to oauth2_test.go Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Reverted go.mod and go.sum to the state of master Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Don't omit client secret check for PKCE Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * Remove "Authorization" as Accepted Headers on CORS, small fixes Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Revert "Allow public clients (e.g. with PKCE) to have redirect URIs configured" This reverts commit b6e297b78537dc44cd3e1374f0b4d34bf89404ac. Signed-off-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> * PKCE on client_secret client error message * When connecting to the token endpoint with PKCE without client_secret, but the client is configured with a client_secret, generate a special error message. Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * Output info message when PKCE without client_secret used on confidential client * removes the special error message Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> * General missing/invalid client_secret message on token endpoint Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <Bernd.Eckstein@faro.com> Co-authored-by: Tadeusz Magura-Witkowski <tadeuszmw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Martin Heide <martin.heide@faro.com> Co-authored-by: M. Heide <66078329+heidemn-faro@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-10-26 16:03:40 +05:30
func checkErrorResponse(err error, t *testing.T, tc test) {
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: DANGEROUS! got a token when we should not get one!", tc.name)
return
}
if rErr, ok := err.(*oauth2.RetrieveError); ok {
if rErr.Response.StatusCode != tc.tokenError.StatusCode {
t.Errorf("%s: got wrong StatusCode from server %d. expected %d",
tc.name, rErr.Response.StatusCode, tc.tokenError.StatusCode)
}
details := new(OAuth2ErrorResponse)
if err := json.Unmarshal(rErr.Body, details); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: could not parse return json: %s", tc.name, err)
return
}
if tc.tokenError.Error != "" && details.Error != tc.tokenError.Error {
t.Errorf("%s: got wrong Error in response: %s (%s). expected %s",
tc.name, details.Error, details.ErrorDescription, tc.tokenError.Error)
}
} else {
t.Errorf("%s: unexpected error type: %s. expected *oauth2.RetrieveError", tc.name, reflect.TypeOf(err))
}
}
type oauth2Client struct {
config *oauth2.Config
token *oauth2.Token
server *httptest.Server
}
// TestRefreshTokenFlow tests the refresh token code flow for oauth2. The test verifies
// that only valid refresh tokens can be used to refresh an expired token.
func TestRefreshTokenFlow(t *testing.T) {
state := "state"
now := time.Now
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Now = now
})
defer httpServer.Close()
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
var oauth2Client oauth2Client
oauth2Client.server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != "/callback" {
// User is visiting app first time. Redirect to dex.
http.Redirect(w, r, oauth2Client.config.AuthCodeURL(state), http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
// User is at '/callback' so they were just redirected _from_ dex.
q := r.URL.Query()
if errType := q.Get("error"); errType != "" {
if desc := q.Get("error_description"); desc != "" {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s: %s", errType, desc)
} else {
t.Errorf("got error from server %s", errType)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Grab code, exchange for token.
if code := q.Get("code"); code != "" {
token, err := oauth2Client.config.Exchange(ctx, code)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %v", err)
return
}
oauth2Client.token = token
}
// Ensure state matches.
if gotState := q.Get("state"); gotState != state {
t.Errorf("state did not match, want=%q got=%q", state, gotState)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer oauth2Client.server.Close()
// Register the client above with dex.
redirectURL := oauth2Client.server.URL + "/callback"
client := storage.Client{
ID: "testclient",
Secret: "testclientsecret",
RedirectURIs: []string{redirectURL},
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
oauth2Client.config = &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "offline_access"},
RedirectURL: redirectURL,
}
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resp, err := http.Get(oauth2Client.server.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
tok := &oauth2.Token{
RefreshToken: oauth2Client.token.RefreshToken,
Expiry: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
}
// Login in again to receive a new token.
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resp, err = http.Get(oauth2Client.server.URL + "/login")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get failed: %v", err)
}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
// try to refresh expired token with old refresh token.
if _, err := oauth2Client.config.TokenSource(ctx, tok).Token(); err == nil {
t.Errorf("Token refreshed with invalid refresh token, error expected.")
}
}
// TestOAuth2DeviceFlow runs device flow integration tests against a test server
func TestOAuth2DeviceFlow(t *testing.T) {
clientID := "testclient"
clientSecret := ""
requestedScopes := []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "email", "profile", "groups", "offline_access"}
t0 := time.Now()
// Always have the time function used by the server return the same time so
// we can predict expected values of "expires_in" fields exactly.
now := func() time.Time { return t0 }
// Connector used by the tests.
var conn *mock.Callback
idTokensValidFor := time.Second * 30
for _, tc := range makeOAuth2Tests(clientID, clientSecret, now).tests {
func() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Setup a dex server.
httpServer, s := newTestServer(ctx, t, func(c *Config) {
c.Issuer += "/non-root-path"
c.Now = now
c.IDTokensValidFor = idTokensValidFor
})
defer httpServer.Close()
mockConn := s.connectors["mock"]
conn = mockConn.Connector.(*mock.Callback)
p, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, httpServer.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get provider: %v", err)
}
// Add the Clients to the test server
client := storage.Client{
ID: clientID,
RedirectURIs: []string{deviceCallbackURI},
Public: true,
}
if err := s.storage.CreateClient(client); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create client: %v", err)
}
// Grab the issuer that we'll reuse for the different endpoints to hit
issuer, err := url.Parse(s.issuerURL.String())
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could not parse issuer URL %v", err)
}
// Send a new Device Request
codeURL, _ := url.Parse(issuer.String())
codeURL.Path = path.Join(codeURL.Path, "device/code")
data := url.Values{}
data.Set("client_id", clientID)
data.Add("scope", strings.Join(requestedScopes, " "))
resp, err := http.PostForm(codeURL.String(), data)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could not request device code: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
responseBody, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could read device code response %v", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%v - Unexpected Response Type. Expected 200 got %v. Response: %v", tc.name, resp.StatusCode, string(responseBody))
}
if resp.Header.Get("Cache-Control") != "no-store" {
t.Errorf("Cache-Control header doesn't exist in Device Code Response")
}
// Parse the code response
var deviceCode deviceCodeResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(responseBody, &deviceCode); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Unexpected Device Code Response Format %v", string(responseBody))
}
// Mock the user hitting the verification URI and posting the form
verifyURL, _ := url.Parse(issuer.String())
verifyURL.Path = path.Join(verifyURL.Path, "/device/auth/verify_code")
urlData := url.Values{}
urlData.Set("user_code", deviceCode.UserCode)
resp, err = http.PostForm(verifyURL.String(), urlData)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Error Posting Form: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
responseBody, err = ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could read verification response %v", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%v - Unexpected Response Type. Expected 200 got %v. Response: %v", tc.name, resp.StatusCode, string(responseBody))
}
// Hit the Token Endpoint, and try and get an access token
tokenURL, _ := url.Parse(issuer.String())
tokenURL.Path = path.Join(tokenURL.Path, "/device/token")
v := url.Values{}
v.Add("grant_type", grantTypeDeviceCode)
v.Add("device_code", deviceCode.DeviceCode)
resp, err = http.PostForm(tokenURL.String(), v)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could not request device token: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
responseBody, err = ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Could read device token response %v", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%v - Unexpected Token Response Type. Expected 200 got %v. Response: %v", tc.name, resp.StatusCode, string(responseBody))
}
// Parse the response
var tokenRes accessTokenResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(responseBody, &tokenRes); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Unexpected Device Access Token Response Format %v", string(responseBody))
}
token := &oauth2.Token{
AccessToken: tokenRes.AccessToken,
TokenType: tokenRes.TokenType,
RefreshToken: tokenRes.RefreshToken,
}
raw := make(map[string]interface{})
json.Unmarshal(responseBody, &raw) // no error checks for optional fields
token = token.WithExtra(raw)
if secs := tokenRes.ExpiresIn; secs > 0 {
token.Expiry = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(secs) * time.Second)
}
// Run token tests to validate info is correct
// Create the OAuth2 config.
oauth2Config := &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: client.ID,
ClientSecret: client.Secret,
Endpoint: p.Endpoint(),
Scopes: requestedScopes,
RedirectURL: deviceCallbackURI,
}
if len(tc.scopes) != 0 {
oauth2Config.Scopes = tc.scopes
}
err = tc.handleToken(ctx, p, oauth2Config, token, conn)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: %v", tc.name, err)
}
}()
}
}